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JUDGES AND THEIR PAPERS
KATHRYN A. WATTS*
Who should own a federal judge’s papers? This question has rarely been asked.
Instead, it has generally been accepted that the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
and other federal judges own their working papers, which include papers created
by judges relating to their official duties, such as internal draft opinions, confiden-
tial vote sheets, and case-related correspondence. This longstanding tradition of pri-
vate ownership has led to tremendous inconsistency. For example, Justice
Thurgood Marshall’s papers were released just two years after he left the bench,
revealing behind-the-scenes details about major cases involving issues such as abor-
tion and flag burning. In contrast, Justice David Souter’s papers will remain closed
until the fiftieth anniversary of his retirement, and substantial portions of Justice
Byron White’s papers, including files relating to the landmark case of Miranda v.
Arizona, were shredded. In addition, many collections of lower federal court
judges’ papers have been scattered in the hands of judges’ families. Notably, this
private ownership model has persisted despite the fact that our country’s treatment
of presidential records shifted from private to public ownership through the
Presidential Records Act of 1978. Furthermore, private ownership of judicial
papers has endured even though it has proven ill-equipped to balance the many
competing interests at stake, ranging from calls for governmental accountability
and transparency on the one hand, to the judiciary’s independence, collegiality,
confidentiality, and integrity on the other.
This Article is the first to give significant attention to the question of who should
own federal judges’ working papers and what should happen to the papers once a
judge leaves the bench. Upon the thirty-fifth anniversary of the enactment of the
Presidential Records Act, this Article argues that judges’ working papers should be
treated as governmental property—just as presidential papers are. Although there
are important differences between the roles of president and judge, none of the
differences suggest that judicial papers should be treated as a species of private
property. Rather than counseling in favor of private ownership, the unique position
of federal judges, including the judiciary’s independence in our constitutional
design, suggests the advisability of crafting rules that speak to reasonable access to
and disposition of judicial papers. Ultimately, this Article—giving renewed atten-
tion to a long-forgotten 1977 governmental study commissioned by Congress—
argues that Congress should declare judicial papers public property and should
empower the judiciary to promulgate rules implementing the shift to public owner-
ship. These would include, for example, rules governing the timing of public release
of judicial papers. By involving the judiciary in implementing the shift to public
ownership, Congress would enhance the likelihood of judicial cooperation, mitigate
separation of powers concerns, and enable the judiciary to safeguard judicial inde-
pendence, collegiality, confidentiality, and integrity.
* Copyright © 2013 by Kathryn Watts, Garvey Schubert Barer Professor of Law at the
University of Washington School of Law. Thanks to Gregory Alexander, Ryan Calo,
Ronald Collins, Lisa Manheim, Peter Nicolas, Rafael Pardo, Eduardo Pen˜alver, Elizabeth
Porter, Sallie Sanford, and Joseph Thai for helpful comments, as well as to David
Crawford, William Goodling, and Cheryl Nyberg for excellent research assistance. I also
want to thank Judge A. Raymond Randolph and Justice John Paul Stevens because my
clerkships with them helped to spark my interest in the operations of the federal judiciary.
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INTRODUCTION
In the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court’s blockbuster
June 2012 ruling on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act,1
something fairly remarkable occurred: Sources within the Court
leaked behind-the-scenes details.2 Just days after the Court’s ruling
came down, a CBS News report—relying upon “two sources with spe-
cific knowledge” of the deliberations that took place among the
Justices—confirmed widespread speculation among Court watchers
that “Chief Justice John Roberts initially sided with the Supreme
Court’s four conservative justices to strike down the heart of
President Obama’s health care reform law . . . but later changed his
position and formed an alliance with liberals to uphold the bulk of the
law.”3 According to CBS’s inside sources, Chief Justice Roberts’s
change in position provoked the ire of the four conservatives and
pushed them to independently craft a highly unusual unsigned joint
dissent.4 A different media outlet—quoting a “source within the court
with direct knowledge of the drafting process”—also reported that
Chief Justice Roberts had changed his vote in the case but countered
the CBS account by reporting that “most of the material in the first
three quarters of the joint dissent” was actually drafted in Chief
Justice Roberts’s chambers before Roberts changed his vote, not in
the chambers of the four conservative dissenting Justices.5
Although not wholly unprecedented,6 such high-profile leaks are
quite unusual. This is because—in contrast to the White House or
Congress—the Supreme Court is shrouded in intense secrecy.7 A
1 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2 See, e.g., Sam Baker, Supreme Court Healthcare Ruling Leaks Have DC Buzzing:
Who Is the Culprit?, THE HILL (July 4, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/
healthwatch/legal-challenges/236197-supreme-court-talk-has-dc-buzzing-who-is-the-leaker
(“Supreme Court observers are shocked at the leaks that are flowing from the high court’s
chambers in the wake of its landmark healthcare decision. In contrast to Congress . . . and
the White House . . . the court has a reputation as leak-proof, which is a key part of its
above-the-fray image.”).
3 Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July
1, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched-
views-to-uphold-health-care-law.
4 Id. 
5 Paul Campos, Roberts Wrote Both Obamacare Opinions, SALON (July 3, 2012, 6:13
PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/07/03/roberts_wrote_both_obamacare_opinions.
6 See Jonathan Peters, The Supreme Court Has Always Leaked, SLATE (July 6, 2012,
2:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/07/the_
supreme_court_leaking_john_robert_s_decision_to_change_his_mind_on_health_care_
should_not_come_as_such_a_surprise_.html (describing the history of leaks at the Court).
7 See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 1 (1979) (“No
American institution has so completely controlled the way it is viewed by the public. The
Court’s deliberative process—its internal debates, the tentative positions taken by the
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variety of factors contribute to this secrecy. The Court, for example,
has been steadfast in its refusal to televise its oral arguments or to
allow cameras into the courtroom.8 Although the Court’s oral argu-
ments are technically open to the public, only a small number of
public seats are actually available, which means that often members of
the public must go to great lengths, even including camping overnight
outside the Court, in order to secure a spot.9 After oral arguments, the
nine Justices disappear behind a curtain and then conference and vote
on argued cases in private without even allowing aides or law clerks
into the conference room.10 Confidentiality rules forbid law clerks
from disclosing to the public internal information they learn as a result
of their employment with the Court,11 and the judiciary is exempt
from the public disclosure requirements of the Freedom of
Information Act and other sunshine laws.12 Indeed, given the tight-
lipped nature of the Court, the only way the public will likely ever
learn what actually happened behind the scenes in the Court’s block-
buster health care ruling—and which media outlet, if any, got the
story correct—will be via the release of the working papers of a
retired or deceased Justice who sat on the case.13
Justices, the preliminary votes, the various drafts of written opinions, the negotiations, con-
frontations, and compromises—is hidden from public view.”); Kathryn A. Watts,
Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4
(2011) (“[T]he Court operates outside of the public eye and under a cloak of secrecy.”).
8 See Bruce D. Collins, C-SPAN’s Long and Winding Road to a Still Un-Televised
Supreme Court, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 12, 12 (2007), available at http://
www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/106/collins.pdf; On Cameras in Supreme Court,
Souter Says, “Over My Dead Body,” N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1996, at 24.
9 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Tailgating Outside the Supreme Court, Without Cars, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, at A14 (discussing the various members of the public who had gath-
ered to hear oral arguments).
10 See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 259–61 (9th ed. 2011) (“Conference discussions are secret, except for revelations
in justices’ opinions, off-the-bench communications, or, when available, private papers.”).
11 See id. at 127 (discussing the Supreme Court’s Code of Conduct for Supreme Court
Law Clerks, which instructs the clerks not to discuss the work of the Court, except with the
Justices or other clerks, even after their clerkship has ended).
12 Brief of Respondent-Petitioner at 38, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)
(No. 87-7028) (“[T]he Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the Government-
in-the-Sunshine Act apply only to executive, and not to judicial, bodies . . . .” (citations
omitted)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2012) (defining “agency” as an “executive depart-
ment, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation,
or other establishment in the executive branch . . . or any independent regulatory agency”
for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act); id. § 552a(a)(1) (applying the defini-
tion in § 552(f) to the Privacy Act); id. § 552b(a)(1) (applying the same definition to the
Government in the Sunshine Act).
13 Cf. Linda Greenhouse, The Story So Far, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2012, 7:30 PM), http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/the-story-so-far/ (“History may someday settle
on one of the competing and contradictory narratives now running rampant within the
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A judge or Justice’s working papers include those papers gener-
ated in the course of deciding cases and other judicial matters.14 In
contrast to the official record in a case, which might include official
hearing transcripts, briefs, motions, and final opinions that are pub-
licly accessible, judicial working papers often include a treasure trove
of behind-the-scenes details about the judiciary’s confidential deci-
sional process, such as internal draft opinions, case-related correspon-
dence, law clerks’ work product, conference notes, and vote sheets.
Unlike presidential papers—now treated as governmental rather
than private property as a result of the Presidential Records Act of
1978 (PRA), passed in the wake of the Watergate scandal15—judges’
papers have never been affirmatively regulated by Congress or the
judiciary. This means that no uniform rule governs judges’ working
papers—other than a longstanding historical default, which embraces
private ownership of judicial papers and gives individual judges and
their heirs complete control over the fate of their papers.16 And unlike
rules governing presidential papers, which have received at least some
scholarly attention over time,17 scholars generally have failed to
virtual Beltway to explain the decision by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. to save the
Affordable Care Act.”).
14 See Alexandra K. Wigdor, A Survey of the Collections of Personal Papers of Supreme
Court Justices, in THE RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS: A SELECTION OF MATERIALS
FROM THE NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS OF FEDERAL
OFFICIALS 199, 199 (Anna Kasten Nelson ed., 1978) [hereinafter RECORDS OF FEDERAL
OFFICIALS] (noting the distinction between “working papers” created in the course of ren-
dering decisions and “private papers,” which might include private correspondence with
family and friends or personal diaries); see also Del Dickson, Introduction to THE
SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 1940–1985: PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, at xxiii, xxv (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (noting that the Justices’
private papers, including their conference notes, “are compiled during the daily course of
business and are not intended for public consumption”).
15 Presidential Records Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207 (2006)).
16 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A GUIDE TO THE PRESERVATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES’
PAPERS 1 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter FJC GUIDE], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.
nsf/lookup/judgpa2d.pdf/$file/judgpa2d.pdf (“The chambers papers of a federal judge
remain the private property of that judge or the judge’s heirs, and it is the prerogative of
the judge or the judge’s heirs to determine the disposition of those papers.”).
17 See, e.g., Philip G. Schrag, Working Papers as Federal Records: The Need for New
Legislation to Preserve the History of National Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 95 (1994)
(focusing on the need for preservation of the records of the executive branch relating to
significant national policies); Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular
Government: The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of
Ownership and Control of Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651, 651 (2003)
(addressing “the long-standing dispute over the disclosure of presidential papers from his-
torical, constitutional, and philosophical perspectives”). For further discussion of the
debate surrounding disclosure of presidential papers, see generally Carl Bretscher,
Presidential Records Act: The President and Judicial Review Under the Records Acts, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477 (1992); Carl McGowan, Presidents and Their Papers, 68 MINN.
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address the question of whether to or how best to regulate judicial
working papers.18
Congress has given serious national attention to the proper han-
dling of judicial working papers at only two points in our country’s
history. The first was in the 1970s when the Nixon Watergate scandal
pushed the issue of access to the records of public officials to the fore-
front of the nation’s consciousness,19 prompting Congress to create a
governmental commission to study the issue of access to public
records created by all three branches.20 The second was in 1993 when
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers—containing more than 3000 case
files spanning his twenty-four-year career on the U.S. Supreme
Court—were opened to researchers upon his death just two years
after he retired from the bench, revealing a wealth of inside informa-
tion about the Court’s handling of hot-button issues such as flag
L. REV. 409 (1983); Sandra E. Richetti, Comment, Congressional Power Vis-a`-vis the
President and Presidential Papers, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 773 (1994); Stephen H. Yuhan, Note,
The Imperial Presidency Strikes Back: Executive Order 13,233, the National Archives, and
the Capture of Presidential History, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1570 (2004).
18 No law review articles or books address in any significant detail the normative ques-
tion of how best to handle ownership of judicial papers or what kinds of rules should
govern judges’ papers once a judge leaves the bench. Two very useful scholarly works,
however, do give significant descriptive treatment to how our nation has handled judicial
papers as a historical matter. The first is a book on cultural treasures by Joseph Sax, which
includes a chapter specifically addressing the papers of Supreme Court Justices. JOSEPH L.
SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL
TREASURES 93–116 (1999). The second is a book by Alexandra Wigdor that serves prima-
rily as a descriptive guide to the collections of Supreme Court Justices. ALEXANDRA K.
WIGDOR, THE PERSONAL PAPERS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1986). It also includes
general discussion of past practices regarding preservation of and access to judicial collec-
tions. See id. at xi. Other than these two largely descriptive discussions about the handling
of Justices’ papers, scholars have engaged with the issue of ownership and access to judicial
papers only in passing or at a fairly high level of generality. See, e.g., J. Woodford Howard,
Jr., Comment on Secrecy and the Supreme Court, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 842 (1973) (briefly
noting that the subject of access to judicial papers “is in serious need of standards to pre-
vent some lamentable practices such as destruction of records that belong to the public,
scrambling for monopolistic control of papers on the part of archivists and scholars, and
leaks via judicial papers that intrude on the Court’s current operations”); Adrian
Vermeule, Essay, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311, 1347 (1999) (noting in passing that
judicial papers are the property of the judge and that “there is no guarantee that an official
system for gathering and publishing judicial history, akin to the Congressional Record,
could lawfully be created”).
19 The Nixon scandal stemmed from a burglary in 1972 of the Democratic National
Committee headquarters at the Watergate Hotel a few months before Nixon’s reelection.
Various high-level White House officials were implicated in the burglary. See generally
CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974). This led to a
fight over access to White House tapes of conversations between Nixon and others, which
the Supreme Court ultimately resolved. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
20 See infra notes 141–57 and accompanying text.
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burning, civil rights, and abortion.21 Concerns that the early release of
the Marshall papers had invaded the Court’s sanctity, independence,
and deliberative process led to a congressional hearing in 1993.22
Ultimately, however, neither Congress nor the judiciary ever took any
action to regulate judicial papers in the wake of the hearing, leaving in
place the historical default, which treats judges’ working papers as pri-
vate property.
Not surprisingly, the longstanding proprietary theory of owner-
ship governing judicial papers has led to tremendous inconsistency—
ranging from the shredding, destruction, or burning of some papers to
the preservation and public release of others. With respect to the
papers of lower federal court judges, relatively few collections of judi-
cial papers have been preserved—in large part because the cost and
burden of preserving the papers fall on judges and their heirs.23 The
record of preservation with respect to the papers of Supreme Court
Justices is better but it too has varied over time and from Justice to
Justice.24 For example, prior to the beginning of the 1986 Term, Justice
Byron White—after twenty-five years on the Court—decided to
“clean up the place,” and he and his law clerks ran file after file,
including a file on Miranda v. Arizona,25 through a shredder.26 In con-
trast, some Justices have chosen to make their papers available only
after long periods of access restrictions, as Justice David Souter did
when he announced that his papers would not be open for a full fifty
years after his retirement.27 There is, in other words, “by no means a
uniform practice” when it comes to the papers of Supreme Court
21 See Neil A. Lewis, Rare Glimpses of Judicial Chess and Poker, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
1993, at A1; see also Joan Biskupic, How an Era Ended in Civil Rights Law, WASH. POST,
May 24, 1993, at A1; Tony Mauro, Marshall’s Papers Cause Supreme Stir: Justice Tilted at
Court’s Windmills, USA TODAY, May 27, 1993, at 1A; David G. Savage, Marshall Papers
Show O’Connor Delaying Court Work Law, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1993, at A6; Benjamin
Weiser & Joan Biskupic, Secrets of the High Court: Papers Afford a Rare Glimpse of
Justices’ Deliberations, WASH. POST, May 23, 1993, at A1.
22 Public Papers of Supreme Court Justices: Assuring Preservation and Access: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Regulation and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 103d Cong. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Judicial Papers Hearing] (statement of Sen.
Joseph I. Lieberman, Member, Subcomm. on Regulation and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm.
on Governmental Affairs).
23 See infra Part I.B.1.
24 See infra Part I.B.2.
25 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26 See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A
PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 3 (1998).
27 See Linda Greenhouse, Down the Memory Hole, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at A31
(lamenting the loss to history from Justice Souter’s fifty-year hold on his papers); cf. SAX,
supra note 18, at 96 (“Justice Jackson’s papers were functionally unavailable to researchers
for thirty years after he dropped dead of a heart attack in 1954 while still serving at the
Court.”).
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Justices or lower federal court judges, and there is nothing that
restrains any Justice or judge from making his own plans for his
working papers, even if those plans include a “bonfire.”28
This ad hoc system, which allows the preferences of individual
judges rather than any uniform rules to determine the fate of judicial
papers, has not proven capable of balancing the many competing
interests that surround judicial papers in a concerted or collaborative
manner. On the one hand, researchers’ interest in gaining access to
materials of significant historical value and the public’s interest in gov-
ernmental transparency, accountability, and disclosure have been
thwarted when individual judges have destroyed their papers, allowed
them to be scattered in the hands of heirs, or kept them from the
public eye for long waiting periods. On the other hand, the judiciary’s
independence, collegiality, confidentiality, and integrity have been
called into question by the release of other judges’ papers.
In light of the significant stakes that surround judicial papers, this
Article addresses the important but rarely asked question of who
should own judicial working papers—including papers created both
by Supreme Court Justices and by lower federal court judges—and
how best to dispose of such papers. Ultimately, this Article argues as a
normative matter that judicial papers should be treated as govern-
mental rather than private property, just as presidential papers are.
Although there are significant differences between the roles of presi-
dent and judge, none of these differences suggest that judicial papers
should be treated as a species of private property. The unique position
of judges in our country, including the independence of our judiciary,
should be taken into account when crafting rules to govern access to
and disposition of judicial papers, not when answering the threshold
question of ownership. Hence, this Article argues in favor of congres-
sional legislation declaring judicial papers to be public property that
shall be made reasonably accessible to the public and empowering the
Judicial Conference of the United States to promulgate its own rules
governing the specifics of reasonable access and disposition. These
would include, for example, rules speaking to the precise timing of
release of judicial papers, the selection of suitable depositories, and
the respective treatment of papers produced by different types of fed-
eral courts so as to account for varying levels of historical and curato-
rial interest.
In proposing a shift from a private to a public ownership model
for judicial papers, this Article gives renewed attention to a long-
forgotten report published in 1977 by the National Study Commission
28 SAX, supra note 18, at 94.
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on Records and Documents of Federal Officials, a commission estab-
lished by Congress to study problems with respect to control of fed-
eral records in the wake of the Nixon Watergate scandal.29 The
Commission’s report set forth various recommendations governing
access to the papers of all three branches, ultimately recommending
that the papers of all branches be treated as public property.30 With
respect to the judiciary, it not only made this general recommenda-
tion, but also proposed that public access to judicial papers be allowed
no more than fifteen years after a judge or Justice left the federal
bench.31 Although Congress responded to those portions of the
Commission’s report that dealt with presidential records by enacting
the PRA,32 Congress ultimately punted on the issue of judicial
records, possibly so as to give the judiciary a chance to address the
issue on its own.33 Yet some thirty-five years later, neither the judi-
ciary nor Congress has addressed the subject, leaving the ultimate dis-
position of judicial papers—including papers relating to major cases
like the recent Affordable Care Act case—up to the whims of indi-
vidual Justices and judges. On the thirty-fifth anniversary of the pas-
sage of the PRA, this Article asserts that the time for waiting has long
passed and that Congress should adopt a more uniform approach for
handling judicial papers based on a public ownership model.34
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the longstanding
historical roots of the proprietary theory of ownership and its conse-
quences, illustrating the wide array of ways with which federal judges
and Supreme Court Justices have dealt with their papers over time.
Part II argues that continued adherence to the proprietary theory of
ownership is problematic for two main reasons: (1) The private own-
ership model is at odds with our shift from private to public ownership
of presidential papers and cannot be explained by modern property
29 See NAT’L STUDY COMM’N ON RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS OF FED. OFFICIALS,
FINAL REPORT 1 (1977) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT] (stating the purpose for which
the commission was created).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 39, 41.
32 Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207
(2006)).
33 See infra at notes 163–66 and accompanying text. Congress also punted on the issue
of congressional papers, declining to follow the Commission’s recommendation proposing
a statute that would treat papers created by individual congressmen as public property. See
infra note 164 and accompanying text.
34 One could make similar arguments with respect to the ownership of congressional
papers. After all, both congressional papers created by individual congressmen and judicial
papers created by judges are made by public officials in connection with the discharge of
their public duties. However, because significant differences do exist between Congress
and the judiciary, this Article focuses on judicial papers and does not directly address the
question of how congressional papers should be regulated.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-5\NYU503.txt unknown Seq: 10 22-OCT-13 14:50
1674 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1665
theories; and (2) as a policy matter, the private ownership model has
proven ill equipped to balance the many competing interests sur-
rounding judicial papers. Part III addresses the question of how best
to achieve a shift to public ownership for judicial papers. Finally, Part
IV considers potential objections to the proposal set forth here,
including the possibility of chilling judicial deliberations, the financial
costs that would flow from preserving the papers of both lower federal
court judges and Supreme Court Justices, concerns about judicial
independence and separation of powers, and congressional inertia
relating to both congressional and judicial papers.
I
THE LONGSTANDING TRADITION OF TREATING JUDICIAL
PAPERS AS A SPECIES OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
Papers created by federal judges consist primarily of two kinds of
materials: official papers and personal papers. Official papers include
those materials that relate to the official record in a judicial matter or
a case, such as briefs, transcripts, motions, judgments, and orders.35
Official judicial records are maintained and disposed of by the govern-
ment according to various statutory and regulatory provisions.36
Although the Supreme Court is exempt from some provisions relating
to the maintenance of judicial records, the Supreme Court authorized
the Clerk of the Court to deposit its official records with the National
Archives beginning in 1956.37 Thus, the official judicial records of both
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts are viewed as govern-
mental records and are held either in the National Archives or by the
court which created them.38
In contrast to official papers, a judge’s personal papers include
both working papers and private papers. Working papers are created
by a judge relating to official duties, such as conference notes,
35 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 22 (making the distinction between offi-
cial and personal papers); see also FJC GUIDE, supra note 16, at 10–11 (listing official
papers to be preserved).
36 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 22–23 (describing various statutory and
regulatory provisions governing the official records of the lower federal courts); see also 44
U.S.C. § 3101 (2006) (obligating heads of federal agencies to “preserve records containing
adequate and proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, pro-
cedures, and essential transactions”).
37 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 25.
38 See Ferris E. Stovel, Judicial Records in the National Archives, in RECORDS OF
FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 189, 194–95 (describing the retention of the official
records of courts); see also 28 U.S.C. § 457 (2006) (“The records of district courts and of
courts of appeals shall be kept at one or more of the places where court is held. Such places
shall be designated by the respective courts except when otherwise directed by the judicial
council of the circuit.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-5\NYU503.txt unknown Seq: 11 22-OCT-13 14:50
November 2013] JUDGES AND THEIR PAPERS 1675
correspondence between judges about cases, law clerks’ work product
in specific cases, internal draft opinions, memoranda, vote sheets, and
papers relating to a judge’s official administrative duties, such as the
Chief Justice’s papers relating to his administrative oversight over the
federal courts. In contrast, a judge’s private papers consist of nonoffi-
cial papers, such as private correspondence with friends and family,
personal diaries, and financial records.39 It is judges’ working
papers—not their private papers relating to nonofficial matters—that
are the focus of this Article.40
Whereas official judicial records are treated as governmental
records and subject to various records management rules, judges’ per-
sonal papers found in chamber files—including their working
papers—have historically been viewed as judges’ private property.41
Indeed, a 2009 guide to the preservation of federal judges’ papers pre-
pared by the Federal Judicial Center states:
The chambers papers of a federal judge remain the private property
of that judge or the judge’s heirs, and it is the prerogative of the
judge or the judge’s heirs to determine the disposition of those
papers. Neither federal statute nor the policies of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States make any provision for the preserva-
tion of federal judges’ papers. Judges’ staffs or the clerks of court
cannot determine where the papers go, and the National Archives
cannot accept the collections as part of the records of the courts.
Nor are court funds available for the preservation of judges’ papers,
and the federal records centers do not provide temporary storage of
judges’ chambers papers.42
This Part traces the origins of this proprietary theory surrounding
judges’ papers, explaining that it has deep historical roots and
describing how private ownership has led to very inconsistent
approaches with respect to the preservation and disposition of judges’
papers.
A. The Roots of Private Ownership
From the time of our nation’s founding, the Justices of the
Supreme Court and judges of the lower federal courts have treated
39 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 23; see also WIGDOR, supra note 18, at 3.
40 This Article does not challenge the longstanding view that a judge’s private papers
should be treated as the judge’s private property and disposed of according to the judge’s
own wishes.
41 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 23 (noting that the contents of a judge’s
chamber files “traditionally have been considered the private property of the Judge”).
42 FJC GUIDE, supra note 16, at 1 (emphasis added). Because judicial papers are
viewed as private property, the FJC GUIDE acknowledges that a judge’s decision to donate
his papers may raise tax issues. See id. at 31 (noting the complicated law governing tax
deductions for donations of papers).
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their papers as “private property, protected by and alienable
according to the laws of private property.”43 Although it is difficult to
pinpoint exactly where this private ownership model came from or
why it emerged, there are a variety of possible explanations. Many of
these explanations are not specific to the judiciary but rather speak to
the records of the other branches as well.
The dominant view of property rights that existed in the eight-
eenth century may well be one explanation. As Jonathan Turley has
explained, during that time period, John Locke’s view of property,
which “heavily influenced the leaders in the early Republic,” provided
that an “individual acquired a near absolute claim to ownership when
he ‘mixed’ his labor with property in its first possession or creation.”44
Thus, according to Turley, the Lockean view of property that held
sway early in our country’s formation might help to explain why
former presidents were viewed as having private ownership over the
records they created—works they often created in their own
handwriting.45
In particular, Turley finds evidence of this Lockean influence in
an opinion written in 1841 by Justice Story sitting as a circuit justice in
Folsom v. Marsh.46 Justice Story confronted a dispute between Justice
Bushrod Washington, who had inherited President George
Washington’s papers, and a publisher, who had used some materials
from the papers.47 Justice Story ultimately ruled in favor of Justice
Washington and his claims of private ownership, stating: “Unless,
indeed, there be a most unequivocal dedication of private letters and
papers by the author, either to the public, or to some private person, I
hold, that the author has a property therein.”48 According to Turley,
what is striking about this ruling is that “[i]t was not the status of the
author as president, but rather the president as an author that deter-
mined the outcome,” suggesting a “more normative interpretation of
Locke’s labor theory—a creator should be rewarded for his labor.”49
43 WIGDOR, supra note 18, at 3.
44 Turley, supra note 17, at 679.
45 Id. at 680. Turley argues that although Lockean theory seems to have shaped the
view that presidential papers are private property, Lockean theory—when correctly under-
stood—actually should not lead to the conclusion that presidential papers are private prop-
erty. This is because presidents create the papers in their governmental capacity, not their
private capacity. See infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
46 See Turley, supra note 17, at 681–82; see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
47 See id.
48 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345 (emphasis added).
49 Turley, supra note 17, at 682.
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To the extent that Turley is correct about the application of
Lockean theory to presidential papers, Locke’s theory may well
explain not only why presidential papers were originally viewed as pri-
vate property but also why judicial papers have traditionally been
viewed as privately owned. Under this theory, the status of federal
judges as authors—rather than their status as judges—may have
determined that they should be rewarded for their work and should be
viewed as the proper owners of their work.
Another more practical, less theoretical explanation for why gov-
ernmental records were viewed as private at the beginning of our
country’s founding is the fact that governmental manuscript reposito-
ries did not emerge until the turn of the twentieth century.50 Tellingly,
President Benjamin Harrison, who served as president from 1889 to
1893, asserted in his will that he had wanted to leave his papers to a
historical society where the papers might be kept safely together
instead of dividing them between his wife and children but that there
was no suitable organization at that time.51 The Manuscript Division
of the Library of Congress was not established until 1897,52 the
National Archives not until 1934.53 The records profession too is a
relatively recent phenomenon in this country.54 Indeed, an invention
as simple as the “wooden file box” did not emerge in records offices
throughout the country until after the Civil War, and when it did
emerge, it was viewed as a “revolution.”55 Given that there truly was
no infrastructure in place to deal with the preservation of govern-
mental papers in the early years of our country, the principal custo-
dians of such papers were “families and private collectors.”56 Hence,
the private ownership model may well have emerged due to the lack
of any “practical alternative.”57
50 WIGDOR, supra note 18, at 3.
51 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 13.
52 Id.
53 RICHARD J. COX, CLOSING AN ERA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MODERN
ARCHIVES AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT 2 (2000); see also H.G. JONES, THE RECORDS OF
A NATION 5 (1969) (“[T]he voices for archival preservation on the national scene were
singularly ineffective and it was not until the 1870s that considerable interest was exhibited
in the halls of Congress.”).
54 See JONES, supra note 53, at 6–7 (describing the development of public records
around the turn of the twentieth century).
55 H.G. JONES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS 8 (1980) (“The revolution was . . . a
simple wooden ‘file box’ . . . about four inches wide, ten inches high, and a foot deep—just
about the size of a standard sheet of paper folded twice or thrice, wrapped with a ribbon or
placed in a paper jacket, and placed upright in the box.”).
56 See WIGDOR, supra note 18, at 3.
57 See id.
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There are also some court-specific explanations that may shed
light on why judicial records traditionally have been treated as private
property. First, the federal courts historically have been surrounded
by a tradition of judicial secrecy, which may well have prompted early
federal judges to think of their working papers as their own private
property rather than governmental property, or perhaps as property
that should not be disclosed due to concerns that it would threaten the
confidentiality of judicial deliberations and judicial independence.
According to Alexandra Wigdor, who has published a guide to the
locations of the personal papers of Supreme Court Justices, this tradi-
tion of judicial secrecy has roots in many of the procedures and con-
ventions established by Chief Justice John Marshall after he became
chief in 1801.58 For example, Chief Justice Marshall’s desire to have
the Supreme Court speak through one single, official opinion rather
than through seriatim opinions could potentially have led the Justices
to view any papers extraneous to the Court’s official opinion as non-
official documents.59
Second, the federal courts are courts of record.60 The Judiciary
Act of 1789, for example, called for the appointment of clerks for the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts, and it obligated the clerks to
“record all the orders, decrees, judgments and proceedings of the said
court.”61 In light of this, it may well be that judges and Justices deter-
mined early on that anything outside of the official record simply was
not worth keeping in any official capacity.
B. The Consequences of Private Ownership
Regardless of the precise reason for why judges’ papers histori-
cally have been viewed as private property, the consequences of the
longstanding private ownership model are clear: Judicial papers are
governed by individual judges and Justices in an ad hoc manner,
rather than by any uniform rules set by either Congress or the judi-
ciary as a whole.62 This means that judges have followed a dizzying
array of approaches in disposing of their papers—ranging from loss
and destruction of some papers to the preservation and public release
of others.
58 See id. at 5.
59 See SAX, supra note 18, at 94.
60 WIGDOR, supra note 18, at 3.
61 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 7, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (1789).
62 Cf. Editorial, Safeguarding History: Why the Records of Supreme Court Justices
Should Be Governed by Rules—Not Individuals, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2009, at A18
(arguing that uniform rules or guidelines would ensure a more inclusive preservation of
important judicial records).
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1. The Papers of Lower Federal Court Judges
With respect to the working papers of lower federal court judges,
relatively few sets of papers have been preserved and made available
to the public.63 Some notable exceptions do exist. For example, Judge
J. Skelly Wright, a prominent federal judge who served on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, made his papers open to research
upon his retirement.64 In addition, Judge Clement Haynsworth, a
Fourth Circuit judge who was nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1969 by President Nixon but whose nomination ultimately was
rejected by the Senate,65 left his papers to the Library of Congress
when he died.66 Similarly, Judge Gerhard A. Gesell of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, who kept a handwritten
diary containing his thoughts and impressions from his time presiding
over the Oliver North trial, donated his papers to the Library of
Congress.67 These lower federal court judges’ decisions to preserve
and donate their papers, however, represent the exception, not the
norm.
The small number of collections of lower federal court judges’
papers is likely attributable to the fact that judges and their heirs face
the burden of finding suitable archival repositories for their papers.68
A document prepared by the library for the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit relating to the preservation of judges’ papers high-
lights this fact, noting: “While the Eighth Circuit Library manages the
Court Archives documenting the history of the federal courts in the
Eighth Circuit, it unfortunately does not have the space or resources
required for judges’ papers collections, which can be quite
63 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 39.
64 See, e.g., SAX, supra note 18, at 96; see also Library of Congress Catalog Record for
J. Skelly Wright Papers, LIBR. CONG., http://lccn.loc.gov/mm81058982 (last visited Sept. 6,
2013) (noting that the files include “[p]ersonal and professional correspondence, case files,
opinions, memoranda, reports, speeches and writings, financial papers, teaching material,
clippings, printed matter, and photographs documenting Wright’s legal and judicial
career”).
65 Stephen L. Wasby & Joel B. Grossman, Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.: New
Perspective on His Nomination to the Supreme Court, 1990 DUKE L.J. 74, 74 (1990).
66 Editorial, Powell’s Bequest, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH, Dec. 20, 1989, at 14
(“When federal Appeals Court Judge Clement Haynsworth died last month, he performed
a final favor for history: He left his papers to the Library of Congress.”).
67 Preserving the Papers of Federal Judges: A Presentation of the Historical Society of
the D.C. Circuit, HISTORICAL SOC’Y OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT, 7, 10 (June 5, 2009), http://
dcchs.org/Biographies/judgespapers.pdf [hereinafter Presentation of the Historical Society
of the D.C. Circuit].
68 See Testimony Received in Public Hearings, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS,
supra note 14, at 265, 274 (statement of Rayman L. Solomon, Director, History Project,
U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit).
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voluminous.”69 Similarly, the Federal Judicial Center’s Guide to the
Preservation of Federal Judges’ Papers notes: “[T]he National
Archives cannot accept the collections as part of the records of the
courts. Nor are court funds available for the preservation of judges’
papers, and the federal records centers do not provide temporary
storage of judges’ chambers papers.”70
According to the director of a history project at the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, what this often means is that if a
judge dies while in office, the “papers are boxed immediately, taken to
the family, and quite often, the widow is moving from a large house to
a small apartment, and the papers are destroyed.”71 Once the papers
land in the hands of family members, many lower federal court judges’
papers are “gradually scattered and lost, or are destroyed.”72
Alternatively, some judges’ families choose not to open the judge’s
papers to the public or to scholars. For example, Maeva Marcus, who
wrote a book titled Truman and the Steel Seizure Case,73 wanted to
access the papers of the district court judge who decided the famous
“steel seizure” case that ultimately reached the Supreme Court in
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.74 Marcus, however, was
disappointed to learn that the district court judge’s family had “boxes
of stuff,” which “they would not release.”75
2. The Papers of Supreme Court Justices
When compared to the relative dearth of papers of lower federal
court judges, the existence of working papers from Supreme Court
Justices is much more common. The more robust record of preserva-
tion with respect to Supreme Court Justices’ papers is likely due to the
perception that the papers of Supreme Court Justices are more impor-
tant than the papers of lower federal court judges76 and perhaps due
to the comparatively small number of Supreme Court Justices—just
69 U.S. Courts Library, Eighth Circuit, Preservation of Judges’ Papers, U.S. COURTS
LIBRARY EIGHTH CIRCUIT, www.lb8.uscourts.gov/pubsandservices/histsociety/tipsheet_
judgespapers.pdf [hereinafter Eighth Circuit Preservation Guide] (last visited Sept. 6,
2013).
70 FJC GUIDE, supra note 16, at 1.
71 Testimony Received in Public Hearings, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra
note 14, at 265, 274 (statement of Rayman L. Solomon, Director, History Project, U.S.
Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 23, 40.
72 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 24.
73 MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE (1994).
74 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
75 See Presentation of the Historical Society of the D.C. Circuit, supra note 67, at 21.
76 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
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112 Justices in all—who have served over time.77 However, even with
respect to the papers of the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, the
record of preservation is still quite spotty, varying over time and from
Justice to Justice.78
Up until the twentieth century, relatively few Justices’ working
papers were preserved.79 For example, unlike early presidents like
George Washington and James Madison, Chief Justice Marshall “left
no legacy of personal papers and correspondence when he died.”80
Instead, “[h]e and his family routinely destroyed or discarded many
documents during his lifetime.”81 Perhaps this was because neither he
nor his family saw the papers as important.82 Or perhaps it was attrib-
utable to his “desire to destroy such material . . . in keeping with
Marshall’s strong efforts to have the Court reveal itself only through a
single, official voice.”83 In the early years, even the collections of
those Justices who did not take affirmative steps to destroy their
papers were not likely to survive. Due to the lack of any national doc-
ument depositories, “the principal custodians of such papers were
families and private collectors.”84 This in turn “created a high
probability of irretrievable dispersal and chance destruction.”85
With the emergence of manuscript repositories in the United
States and a greater sense of the historical importance of the Justices’
papers,86 an increasing number of significant collections of Justices’
77 The most recent Justice to join the Court, Justice Elena Kagan, serves as the 112th
Justice. See Peter Baker, Kagan Is Sworn In as Fourth Female, and 112th Justice, on the
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at A13. In contrast, there are currently 677
federal district court judgeships and 179 court of appeals judgeships in the country. Federal
Judgeships , U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/Federal
Judgeships.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Federal Judgeships].
78 According to a survey published by Alexandra K. Wigdor in 1986, out of ninety-two
Justices studied, twenty-three Justices left no surviving collection, twenty-eight Justices left
small collections with fewer than 1000 items, twelve Justices left medium-sized collections
with up to 5000 items in each collection, and twenty-nine Justices left large collections. See
WIGDOR, supra note 18, at 31–34.
79 See SAX, supra note 18, at 94 (noting that few working papers from the nineteenth
century still exist).
80 See Mark St. John Erickson, W&M’s Look at John Marshall’s Life: Doing Judge
Justice, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.), Apr. 18, 2006, at A1 (noting that it took
scholars at William & Mary nearly half a century to scour various corners of the world for
papers from Chief Justice John Marshall and to cobble together a set of his papers).
81 Id.
82 See id. (relating an interview with an experienced Marshall papers researcher).
83 SAX, supra note 18, at 94.
84 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 25.
85 Id.
86 See SAX, supra note 18, at 94 (noting that during the second half of the twentieth
century, “the historical value of the justices’ working papers ha[d] been widely
recognized”).
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papers have been preserved in the twentieth and twenty-first centu-
ries. For example, Justices Harold Burton, Tom Clark, William O.
Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, Stanley Reed, Wiley
Rutledge, Potter Stewart, Harlan Fiske Stone, Earl Warren, Louis
Brandeis, Thurgood Marshall, and William Brennan preserved large
collections of their papers.87 So did Justices Lewis Powell,88 Harry
Blackmun,89 William Rehnquist,90 David Souter,91 and Sandra Day
O’Connor.92 In addition, some Justices, like Justice Hugo Black, pre-
served portions of their collections but ordered the destruction of the
rest.93
Even those Justices who have opted for preservation have set
wildly different terms concerning access to and disposition of their
papers. One area where the Justices have diverged involves who is
allowed to review their papers. Some Justices have opened their
papers only to certain privileged scholars for research,94 whereas
others have granted access to all researchers or to the public at large.95
For example, two months before the public opening of Justice Harry
87 See id. at 95. Notably, some of Frankfurter’s papers were stolen from the Library of
Congress in 1972. See Adam Liptak, Memo Adds to Doubt on Rehnquist Denials, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, at A18 (“In 1972, somebody—probably a scholar—stole hundreds of
pages from Justice Frankfurter’s papers at the Library of Congress . . . .”).
88 See Powell’s Bequest, supra note 66 (noting that Powell left his papers to Washington
and Lee University); see also Rob Walker, Powell’s School, W&L, to Get Papers,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 1989, at C9 (noting that Powell’s papers fill twenty-
seven file cabinets and include files on each of the 2300 cases that came before the court
between 1972 and 1987).
89 See The Harry A. Blackmun Papers, LIBR. CONG., http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/
blackmun/ (last visted May 25, 2013); see also Tony Mauro, Blackmun Papers Highlight
Importance of a Single Justice, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 2004, at 13A.
90 See HOOVER INSTITUTION ARCHIVES, STANFORD UNIV., REGISTER OF THE WILLIAM
H. REHNQUIST PAPERS 2 (2008), available at http://cdn.calisphere.org/data/13030/tn/
kt4z09r7tn/files/kt4z09r7tn.pdf.
91 See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
92 See FJC GUIDE, supra note 16, at 40 (noting that access to case files in Justice
O’Connor’s papers, which were deposited with the Library of Congress, are to open upon
her death but that individual case files are to remain closed “during the service of any
justice who participated in the case”).
93 See SAX, supra note 18, at 99–101 (describing how notes from conferences and some
other internal Court documents are missing from Justice Black’s large collection of 56,530
items, which was left to the Library of Congress, because Justice Black instructed his son to
burn his papers involving notes of conversations between the Justices).
94 See id. at 103 (noting that two law professors, Alexander Bickel of Yale and Paul
Freund of Harvard, were appointed as custodians of Justice Brandeis’s papers, and that
they “planned to restrict access completely until a biographer they authorized had used the
papers”).
95 See SAX, supra note 18 at 109 (noting that a microfilm edition of Justice Holmes’s
papers was created and sold to libraries, giving both scholars and interested persons ready
access to the papers); Don Williamson, Editorial, Thanks Thurgood: We Needed That,
SEATTLE TIMES, May 28, 1993, at A12 (noting that Marshall’s agreement with the Library
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Blackmun’s papers, the Blackmun family gave journalist Linda
Greenhouse special access to the papers so that she could review the
papers before the broader public did.96 Similarly, Justice William
Brennan arranged for his biographer, Stephen Wermiel, to have exclu-
sive access to his collection.97 This caused grumbling among other
scholars—especially because seventeen years after Brennan granted
Wermiel special access, Wermiel had yet to finish a biography on
Brennan.98
Justices who opt for preservation of their records also often
diverge in terms of when and where their papers shall be made avail-
able. For example, after initially considering burning all of his
papers,99 Justice Thurgood Marshall ultimately chose to donate his
papers to the Library of Congress, which opened his papers to
researchers upon his death in 1993, just two years after he retired from
the bench.100 His papers revealed a wealth of information about cases
only very recently decided by the Court and also about the other
Justices who were still sitting on the Court.101 Given the short two-
year time span between when Justice Marshall left the bench and
when his papers were released, it is not surprising that Chief Justice
Rehnquist and others on the Court balked at the quick release of the
Marshall papers. In a letter that Rehnquist wrote to James Billington,
the Librarian of Congress, Rehnquist stated:
I speak for a majority of the active Justices of the Court when I say
that we are both surprised and disappointed by the library’s deci-
sion to give unrestricted public access to Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s papers. . . . Unless there is some presently unknown basis
for the library’s actions, we think it is such that future donors of
judicial papers will be inclined to look elsewhere for a repository.102
Billington responded by stressing that the Library of Congress
was simply adhering to the instructions of the donor, noting:
“Restricting or suspending access to the Marshall papers now would
of Congress provided that use of his papers would be limited to “private study on the
premises of the Library by researchers or scholars engaged in serious research”).
96 LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY, at xii (2005).
97 See Jeffrey Toobin, A Not So Brief Recess, NEW YORKER, Jan. 5, 2004, at 28.
98 See id.
99 See SAX, supra note 18, at 114.
100 See Weiser & Biskupic, supra note 21; see also Williamson, supra note 95.
101 See Lewis, supra note 21 (discussing how the Marshall papers were made available
only two years after he left the Court).
102 Williamson, supra note 95 (alteration in original); see also Linda P. Campbell,
Marshall’s Papers Causing Stir: Rehnquist Reports Justices’ Surprise, Disappointment at
Timing of Release, S.F. EXAMINER, May 26, 1993, at A16.
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cast doubt on the Library’s ability to carry out the instructions of a
deceased donor.”103
In contrast to the near-immediate release of Justice Marshall’s
papers, numerous Justices have chosen to make their papers available
only after long periods of access restrictions. For example, Justice
Warren Burger’s son donated his father’s papers to the College of
William & Mary in 1996, but the papers remain closed to researchers
until 2026.104 Justice David Souter decided upon his retirement in
2009 that he would give his papers to the New Hampshire Historical
Society in Concord, New Hampshire, but that they could not be
opened until 2059—a full fifty years after his retirement.105
Other recent Justices have imposed more moderate timing
restrictions. For example, when Justice Harry Blackmun gave his
papers, which included more than 530,000 documents,106 to the
Library of Congress in May 1997,107 he provided that they were not to
be opened until five years after his death.108
Similarly, upon his death, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
provided for delayed access to his case files when he donated his judi-
cial papers to the Hoover Institution Archives at his alma mater,
Stanford University. Specifically, he provided that all case files and
related materials from 1975 to 2005 were to remain closed “during the
lifetime of any member of the Supreme Court who served with
[him].”109 Some of his early case files have already been opened.110
However, given that Chief Justice Rehnquist served with Justice
Clarence Thomas, who was still in his fifties when Rehnquist died, the
access restriction could mean that some of Rehnquist’s case files will
remain closed for two or three more decades.
The preservation of Justices’ papers is increasingly prevalent,111
but not all twentieth-century Justices have chosen to preserve the bulk
103 The Marshall Files: The Complaints and the Library’s Response, WASH. POST, May
27, 1993, at A20.
104 Coll. of William & Mary, Warren Burger Collection, SWEM LIBRARY, https://swem.
wm.edu/research/special-collections/warren-burger-collection (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
105 See Greenhouse, supra note 27.
106 Mauro, supra note 89.
107 About the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, LIBR. CONG., http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/
blackmun/blackmun-ex-about.html (last updated Oct. 14, 2010).
108 See Mauro, supra note 89 (reporting that “Blackmun, who served on the court from
1970 to 1994, was a pack rat” and that his collection “sheds light on the agony and turmoil
over Blackmun’s most famous opinion, Roe vs. Wade, which declared a woman’s right to
an abortion in 1973” (italicization added)).
109 HOOVER INSTITUTION ARCHIVES, supra note 90, at 2.
110 See Adam Liptak & Jonathan D. Glater, Papers Offer a Close-Up of Rehnquist and
the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at A12.
111 See SAX, supra note 18, at 94–95.
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of their papers.112 Take Justice Byron White, for instance. Prior to the
beginning of the 1986 Term, Justice White—having accumulated 25
years of case files—determined it was “time to clean up the place.”113
He and his law clerks then spent successive weekends running files,
including a file on the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona,114
through a paper shredder obtained just for the occasion.115 According
to Dennis Hutchinson’s biography of Justice White, “[o]ne of the
clerks, who had academic ambitions, recalls vividly putting one file
after another marked Miranda v. Arizona through the shredder” and
thinking, “Well, here’s an article; here’s an entire book. I couldn’t
believe how much history was going down the chute.”116 Ultimately,
the papers in Justice White’s collection that did survive ended up at
the Library of Congress, where they were opened to research in 2012,
on the tenth anniversary of his death.117
Similarly, many other members of the twentieth-century Court,
including Owen Roberts, Edward Douglas White, Joseph McKenna,
Rufus Peckham, Sherman Minton, Benjamin Cardozo, Charles
Whitaker, Charles Evan Hughes, Horace Lurton, James McReynolds
and George Sutherland, destroyed all or nearly all of their papers.118
Sherman Minton reportedly ordered his papers burned after reading a
biography of Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, written by Alpheus T.
Mason.119 The book, published in 1956,120 was the first judicial biog-
raphy to “rely on informal, individual papers,”121 and it created quite
a stir due to concerns that it would harm the Court’s integrity and
cause “unnecessary embarrassment.”122
112 See id. at 95 (“Of the 101 justices who had served up to the mid-1980s, 23 left no
collections of papers at all, and another 28 left very little.”).
113 HUTCHINSON, supra note 26.
114 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
115 See HUTCHINSON, supra note 26.
116 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
117 News Release, Library of Cong., Papers of Supreme Court Justice Byron R. White
Opened for Research (Apr. 26, 2012), available at http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/2012/12-089.
html.
118 See SAX, supra note 18, at 94–95.
119 See id. at 94.
120 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956).
121 SAX, supra note 18, at 94; see also Transcript: Documents and Records of the
Judiciary, a Panel Discussion Moderated by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale
University, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 214 (statement of
Sidney Fine, Professor of History, University of Michigan) (noting that the Stone biog-
raphy was the “first judicial biography to penetrate the velour curtain”).
122 See Edmond Cahn, Eavesdropping on Justice, THE NATION, Jan. 5, 1957, at 14, 15;
see also Alan F. Westin, Book Review, 66 YALE L.J. 462, 468–69 (1957) (reviewing
MASON, supra note 120) (questioning the propriety of the author’s use of Justice Stone’s
personal papers to write an extended biography).
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In short, as Joseph Sax aptly noted in his book on national cul-
tural treasures titled Playing Darts with a Rembrandt, there is “by no
means a uniform practice” when it comes to the treatment of a
Justice’s papers.123 Although the modern trend certainly seems to be
in favor of preservation, the Justices’ working papers—like those of
lower federal court judges—are viewed as a species of private prop-
erty, which the Justices may dispose of as they please.
II
QUESTIONING PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
The private ownership model certainly has longstanding historical
roots, but continued adherence to the proprietary theory of ownership
is ill-advised for two main reasons. First, the private ownership model
is at odds with our nation’s shift from a private to public ownership
model for presidential papers through the passage of the PRA, and
the differential treatment of judicial and presidential papers cannot be
explained by any leading property theories.124 Second, the private
ownership model—which leaves the fate of judges’ papers in the
hands of individual judges rather than subject to uniform rules set by
Congress or the judiciary—has proven ill-equipped to balance the
many competing interests surrounding judicial papers in a collabora-
tive or concerted manner.125
A. Inconsistent Treatment of Presidential and Judicial Papers
One reason that continued adherence to private ownership is
troubling is that it puts our treatment of judicial papers at odds with
how we currently treat presidential papers. Even though many differ-
ences exist between presidents and judges, this Subpart argues that
the differences should be taken into account when crafting rules con-
cerning access to and disposition of judges’ papers, not ownership
thereof.
1. The Historical Treatment of Presidential Papers
The early history of presidential papers is very similar to that of
judicial papers in that presidential papers also were viewed originally
as a species of private property.126 This original understanding of
123 See SAX, supra note 18, at 94–95.
124 See infra Part II.A.
125 See infra Part II.B.
126 See Bretscher, supra note 17, at 1481 (“Throughout most of the history of the presi-
dency, presidents regarded their White House records as their personal property, to be
preserved, published, or discarded as they and their heirs saw fit.”); see also McGowan,
supra note 17, at 409 (“Presidents have uniformly viewed any papers accumulated during
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presidential papers as private property was shared by all three
branches of government.127 Indeed, Congress even seemed to con-
done the notion of private ownership by appropriating funds specifi-
cally for the purchase of presidential papers from time to time,
including papers of Presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson,
James Madison, and James Monroe.128
Under the private ownership system for presidential papers,
many presidential collections did not fare very well. Presidential col-
lections often ended up in the hands of former presidents’ families and
heirs where the papers were lost, scattered, or destroyed over time.129
Things, however, slowly began to change in the twentieth century.
One very important development was the establishment of presiden-
tial libraries.130 President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the first
such library in 1939 when he obtained congressional support for a res-
olution that authorized the Archivist of the United States to receive
President Roosevelt’s papers.131 Roosevelt, a “serious student of his-
tory” who was “self-conscious of the public significance of his
papers,”132 firmly believed “that Presidential papers are an important
part of the national heritage and should be accessible to the public,”133
even though he “considered the papers to be his property.”134
Subsequently, in 1950, President Harry S. Truman decided that he too
would build a library to house his papers, and he pushed Congress to
take congressional action on the subject,135 which culminated in
Congress’s passage of the Presidential Libraries Act in 1955.136
Although the Act did not establish governmental ownership over
their terms in office as personal property . . . .”). For a discussion about the early view of
judicial papers, see supra Part I.A.
127 See Title to Presidential Papers—Subpoenas, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 11, 11 (1974) (noting
the “almost unvaried understanding of all three branches of the Government since the
beginning of the Republic” that presidential papers should be privately owned).
128 John McDonough, Manuscript Historian in the Manuscript Division of the Library of
Congress, Remarks During Panel Discussion: Who Owns Presidential Papers? (Sept. 6,
1974), in MANUSCRIPTS, Winter 1975 at 2, 4.
129 See McGowan, supra note 17, at 409 (“This concept of private ownership has made
collection and maintenance of presidential papers difficult and has resulted in the loss of
many historical documents.”).
130 See id. at 413–14 (stating that this development indicates a recognition of presiden-
tial papers’ importance and increasing magnitude).
131 See id. at 413–15.
132 SAX, supra note 18, at 84.
133 A Brief History, Presidential Libraries, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.
gov/presidential-libraries/about/history.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2013). 
134 SAX, supra note 18, at 84.
135 See NATIONAL ARCHIVES, supra note 133.
136 Presidential Libraries Act, ch. 859, 69 Stat. 695 (1955), repealed by Act of Oct. 22,
1968, Pub. L. 90-620, § 3, 82 Stat. 1309.
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presidential materials, it authorized the Archivist of the United States
to accept any papers that a president should voluntarily choose to
leave.137
The next major development came in the wake of President
Richard Nixon’s resignation in 1974 in the midst of the Watergate
scandal.138 Questions arose over whether Nixon could take with him
over forty million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings that he
had accumulated while in office despite the Watergate Special
Prosecutor’s need for access to the materials.139 Ultimately,
Congress—attempting to “assume control of the Nixon tapes and
papers and safeguard them from destruction”—weighed in on the
controversy by passing the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act of 1974 (PRMPA).140
The PRMPA did two things of note. First, Title I specifically
targeted the Nixon records, providing that the Administrator of the
General Services was to seize and retain possession of tape recordings
and other papers accumulated during the Nixon administration.141
Second, Title II of the Act created a temporary National Study
Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials (the
Commission), charged with studying and recommending appropriate
legislation to govern disposition of government records.142 The
thinking was that “the nation had long suffered from the absence of a
clear and definite policy with respect to treatment of the papers of
federal officials” and that a national commission was needed to help
recommend a better path forward.143
The PRMPA specified that the Commission was to consist of sev-
enteen members who would represent different viewpoints.144 Among
the members of the Commission were senators, members of the
House of Representatives, a federal judge, two history professors,
137 See McGowan, supra note 17, at 415.
138 See id. at 415–16.
139 See id. at 416.
140 See RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at xvi; see also Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA), Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695
(1974) (stating, in the preamble, that the Act was meant “[t]o protect and preserve tape
recordings of conversations involving former President Richard M. Nixon and made during
his tenure as President”).
141 See PRMPA, Pub. L. No. 93-526, § 101, 88 Stat. 1695, 1695 (1974). Not surprisingly,
Nixon challenged the constitutionality of the Act, but the Supreme Court rejected his
claims. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 439 (1977) (upholding the Act
against Nixon’s claims that the Act, inter alia, violated separation of powers and repre-
sented a breach of constitutional privilege).
142 44 U.S.C. §§ 3315–3324 (2006); see also McGowan, supra note 17, at 431.
143 McGowan, supra note 17, at 431.
144 See RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at xvi.
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various representatives from the Society of American Archivists, the
Department of Defense, and the Library of Congress, and members of
the public.145 The Commission was chaired by Herbert Brownell, a
former U.S. Attorney General.146
The Commission first gathered factual information relating to
record-keeping in the White House, the judiciary, Congress, and fed-
eral agencies; the Commission’s legal staff researched and gathered
information on legal questions.147 The Commission then held public
hearings around the country in 1976 and 1977.148 These hearings were
augmented by three “panels of experts who were called upon to air
their views for the further edification of the Commissioners and the
staff”; one panel addressed the papers of Congress, another the
papers of the judiciary, and the third panel addressed the papers of
the White House.149
After completing its thorough investigative process, the
Commission issued a lengthy final report in 1977.150 Although the
Commission ultimately could not agree on all the details, the one fun-
damental issue that the Commission’s seventeen members did agree
upon was that federal records, including the records of the President,
members of Congress, and the judiciary, should be treated as public
property.151 Specifically, the final majority report, which was signed by
fifteen members of the Commission, declared: “All documentary
materials made or received by Federal officials in connection with
their constitutional and statutory duties should be the property of the
United States.”152 Similarly, the alternate minority report, which was
signed by the Chairman and another member, noted: “[I]t is time to
end the fiction that the public’s records belong to presidents or other
federal officials and therefore recognize and declare the fact that gov-
ernmental records and documents belong to the people of the United
States.”153 The alternate report reasoned that governmental records
“are produced by and for the President and other federal officials,
145 See McGowan, supra note 17, at 431; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29,
at iii.
146 McGowan, supra note 17, at 431.
147 See RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at xvii.
148 Id. 
149 Id. at xvii–xviii.
150 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29.
151 See RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at xviii (“In spite of diverse
backgrounds and constituencies, the seventeen members of the Commission found them-
selves in agreement on one fundamental issue: ownership.”).
152 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 1.
153 Id. at 65.
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working on government time and utilizing government facilities, in the
course of discharging their official governmental duties.”154
It is quite notable that all seventeen members of the Commission
expressly agreed that Congress should pass legislation declaring the
records of all three branches to be public property, not private prop-
erty.155 Where the majority and alternate reports parted ways was
with respect to the specific details of how best to implement such a
move from private to public ownership. The alternate report, for
instance, proposed extending the Freedom of Information Act to all
three branches,156 whereas the majority report proposed a new statu-
tory mechanism that would provide public access to the papers of
public officials within fifteen years of their exit from office.157
After the majority and alternate reports were released, Congress
took action: It enacted the PRA.158 The PRA terminated the long-
standing tradition of private ownership for presidential papers,159
and—beginning with President Ronald Reagan’s papers—provided
for public access to certain restricted documents, such as confidential
communications between the President and advisors,160 after a twelve-
year time restriction had elapsed.161 It also permitted access to non-
restricted documents under the Freedom of Information Act immedi-
ately upon the completion of archival processing.162
Notably, however, the PRA did nothing with respect to congres-
sional or judicial papers.163 Its sole focus was presidential papers. The
reason for this is somewhat uncertain. With respect to congressional
154 Id.
155 Id. at 3, 97.
156 Id. at 65.
157 Id. at 7.
158 Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (1978) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C.
§§ 2201–2207 (2006)).
159 Bretscher, supra note 17, at 1484 (noting that Congress “terminated the tradition of
private ownership of presidential records in favor of public ownership and control to
ensure their preservation and availability”).
160 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(5) (2006). The other categories of restricted documents are: clas-
sified materials relating to national defense or foreign policy; materials relating to the
“appointments to Federal office”; information “specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute”; privileged or confidential trade secrets and commercial or financial information;
and information “the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy” (for example, medical files). 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(1)–(4), (6) (2006).
161 See 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (2006) (permitting the President to specify access restrictions of
up to twelve years).
162 Id. § 2204(b)(2) (2006) (providing for access to unrestricted documents once the
Archivist of the United States has finished processing but no later than five years after the
date on which the Archivist receives custody of the records).
163 See McGowan, supra note 17, at 434 (“Congress has done nothing to implement the
Commission’s recommendations with respect to Congress itself, the federal judiciary, or
the regulatory agencies.”).
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papers, it appears that Congress believed the problem would best be
addressed via separate rules of each House rather than by statute.164
However, legislative history does not shed light on why Congress did
not follow through on the Commission’s recommendation regarding
the judiciary.165 Perhaps Congress wanted to give the judiciary a
chance to address the issue first in order to show respect to its coordi-
nate branch and avoid potential separation-of-powers questions.166 Or
perhaps Congress—in the immediate aftermath of the Nixon
scandal—was so fixated on solving the issue of presidential papers
that it failed to give serious attention to congressional or judicial
papers. Regardless, the end result is that Congress has never taken
any action to regulate judicial papers, leaving in place the long-
standing historical tradition of private ownership.
2. The Lack of Justifications for Divergent Treatment of the
Ownership of Judicial and Presidential Papers
Certainly, there are important differences between the role and
constitutional design of President and judge. Whereas the President is
elected by the people and is subject to political accountability and
oversight, members of the federal judiciary are insulated from polit-
ical and popular control due to lifetime tenure and salary protections
set forth in the Constitution.167 Further, although the President
addresses the country in many different ways, such as through execu-
tive orders, memoranda, press conferences, television interviews, and
public speeches, the judiciary generally limits its official
164 See Presidential Records Act of 1978: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm.
on Gov’t Operations on H.R. 10998 and Related Bills, 95th Cong. 75–77 (1978) [hereinafter
PRA Hearing] (statement of Rep. Allen E. Ertel) (“The reason we did not include [the
Commission’s proposal to provide access to congressional and judicial papers] in our pro-
posal was the fact that we are advised it would be better done as a resolution of the House
and thereby change the rules, rather than by statutory enactment.”).
165 See id.
166 See Judicial Papers Hearing, supra note 22, at 2–3 (statement of Sen. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Member, Subcomm. on Regulation and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs) (noting that Congress took no action in response to the
Commission’s 1977 report and suggesting that deference to the Supreme Court and con-
cerns about separation-of-powers issues might counsel in favor of giving the Court more
time to act, even though Congress could not “wait for the Court to act forever”). For a
discussion of the separation-of-powers questions that might arise if Congress tried to
govern judicial papers, see infra notes 316–23 and accompanying text.
167 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (establishing that judges are to “hold their Offices
during good Behaviour” and that their compensation cannot be reduced during their ser-
vice); see also Watts, supra note 7, at 35–36 (noting that Supreme Court Justices are fairly
insulated from political control).
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communication to its final judgments and written opinions.168 Finally,
the executive branch’s interpretations of the law are related to and
flow from its enforcement powers,169 while judicial interpretations of
the law are issued in the interest of resolving cases or controversies
between litigants.170 Since the judiciary lacks the power of the sword
that the President possesses, the judiciary relies heavily on its legiti-
macy to ensure that its judgments are enforced.171
However, despite these differences, nothing about the special
position of judges or their constitutionally guaranteed independence
counsels in favor of private ownership of their papers. Judges’
papers—like presidential papers—are created by governmental offi-
cials in furtherance of official duties and often while using govern-
mental resources and facilities. The National Study Commission
recognized as much in 1977, stating:
As is the case with the Public Papers of Presidents and Members of
Congress, the Public Papers of Federal Judges are created in the
course of doing the public’s business, using Government facilities,
and at public expense. The Commission can find no distinctions that
would modify its conclusion that all such materials should be the
property of the United States.172
Judge Carl McGowan, who sat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit, acknowledged as much during one of the
Commission hearings:
I can’t see any reason why the memoranda that [are] in those
files . . . relating to the case itself, law clerks’ memoranda to me, my
memoranda to them, my memoranda to the other judges on the
case, draft opinions, and notes of the conference, all that kind of
thing, they seem to me to be papers generated because I am being
paid by the United States to decide that case. As far as I am con-
cerned, . . . what’s in that file in the sense of papers that are
168 See Tony Mauro, The Supreme Court and the Cult of Secrecy, in A YEAR IN THE LIFE
OF THE SUPREME COURT 263, 263 (Rodney A. Smolla, ed., 1995) (“Supreme Court Justices
are fond of saying that the Court speaks only through its opinions.”). Some exceptions,
such as the Chief Justice’s year-end reports on the federal judiciary, do exist. See Chief
Justice’s Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx (last vis-
ited Sept. 6, 2013) (making the Chief Justice’s reports available to the public).
169 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed . . . .”).
170 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
171 Cf. Watts, supra note 7, at 36 (“[B]ecause the Court enjoys neither the power of the
purse nor the sword, the Court depends on the coordinate branches and the American
public to enforce and follow its judgments.”).
172 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 39.
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necessarily generated in the decision of the case, is the property of
the United States Government . . . .173
Put simply, as Judge McGowan recognized, the creation of judicial
papers in the course of public employment seems to provide a clear
case for viewing judicial papers as public in character.174
This is not to say that differences between the President and the
judge, including the judiciary’s constitutionally guaranteed indepen-
dence and its need to protect its sense of institutional legitimacy and
collegiality, are irrelevant when assessing how best to handle judicial
papers. To the contrary, as discussed in Part III below, the unique
position of judges in our country should be taken into account when
crafting rules relating to access to and disposition of judicial papers—
just not when answering the threshold question of public owner-
ship.175 For example, the tradition of independence, secrecy, and con-
fidentiality that surrounds the judiciary is relevant to the question of
which judicial papers should be disclosed and when, but not to
173 Transcript: Documents and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel Discussion Moderated
by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL
OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 247 (statement of Carl McGowan, J., U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia).
174 Copyright law might provide some support for this notion that the government
should be viewed as the creator of judicial papers. Under what is known as the “work
made for hire” rule in copyright law, employers hold the copyright in materials created by
their employees in the course of their employment. See Sean M. O’Connor, Hired to Invent
vs. Work Made for Hire: Resolving the Inconsistency Among Rights of Corporate
Personhood, Authorship, and Inventorship, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1227, 1233–34 (2012).
In addition, federal law provides that copyright protection is “not available for any work of
the United States Government,” 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012), and the law defines such works as
“work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that
person’s official duties.” Id. § 101. The revision notes accompanying this statutory provi-
sion expressly state that it is not meant to speak to the question of ownership of the gov-
ernmental works themselves. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 59 (1976) (“The use of the term
‘work of the United States Government’ does not mean that a work falling within the
definition of that term is the property of the U.S. Government.” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 105
(2012)). Hence, although not speaking directly to the question of ownership of the govern-
mental works themselves (as opposed to ownership of the intellectual property rights),
these copyright rules do seem to bolster the notion that materials created by employees in
the course of their employment should be viewed as the creations of the employer, not the
employee. They also raise the question of whether ownership in the underlying works and
ownership in the intellectual property rights attached to the works should move together
or separately. With respect to judicial papers, it would seem most logical to have ownership
in the underlying papers and ownership in the intellectual property rights attached to the
papers move together in the same direction such that the government was viewed as the
owner of both.
175 See infra Part III.B.1 (noting that Congress is in the best position to decide questions
of ownership, but that the judiciary should be empowered to decide questions of access
and disposition).
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whether, the papers are public or private in nature.176 Similarly, the
fact that public access to judicial papers might raise issues of judicial
privilege is highly relevant to whether and when the public should be
allowed to access certain judges’ working papers, but not to the ques-
tion of who owns the papers in the first place.177
The bottom line is that because judges’ papers are created by fed-
eral officials on government time relating to official governmental
duties, there is no principled reason—other than historical happen-
stance—to continue treating judicial working papers as a species of
private property. Not even the leading property theories, such as the
Lockean, Hegelian, or utilitarian theories, can be said to support the
continued treatment of judicial papers as private property.178
Locke’s labor theory of property is based around the idea of
“moral desert” and affirms the notion that “a maker is entitled to
ownership of the things she intentionally brings into being” through
her own labor.179 As applied to the question of whether judicial
papers should be viewed as judges’ private property, that notion does
not support an affirmative answer. For one thing, judges do not per-
sonally create many of the papers in their files. Some of their papers,
such as letters, internal memoranda, and internal draft opinions, are
written and created by other judges or by their law clerks. Hence, con-
ferring ownership rights to judges over all papers in their files would
seem to exceed Locke’s theory that one should own what one makes
with one’s own labor.180 Moreover, even those working papers that
judges do personally create using their own labor are created in the
course of official employment for which the judges are compensated
by the government. It could be said that judicial papers are created
using “public labor,” not individual labor, as Jonathan Turley has
176 See id. (describing these traits of the judiciary as relevant to rulemaking regarding
the specifics of disclosure).
177 See infra Part III.B.2.b (addressing the effect of privilege on access questions).
178 In the context of an article on presidential papers, Jonathan Turley reached a similar
conclusion, finding that that the longstanding private ownership model, which treated pres-
idential papers as private property until the passage of the PRA, persisted simply as a
matter of historical tradition and expectation. See Turley, supra note 17, at 721. Turley
concluded that the private ownership model today “lack[s] . . . a conceptual basis,” id., and
asserted that “[t]he creation of presidential papers in the course of public employment
offers a clear and compelling basis for public ownership.” Id. at 719.
179 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEN˜ALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY THEORY 37, 46 (2012). Alexander and Pen˜alver also note that “[t]he usual
reading of Locke’s labor theory understands him as saying that, by mixing something she
owns (her labor) with something she does not own (the raw material on which she labors),
a person comes to acquire a private property right to the object of labor.” Id. at 46.
180 Cf. Turley, supra note 17, at 710 (noting that Locke’s labor theory does not support
private ownership of presidential papers because “presidential papers always involve the
mixing of a variety of individuals’ labor, not just a president’s efforts”).
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argued with respect to presidential papers.181 Re-conceiving the
papers’ creation in this way undermines the entire premise of private
ownership under Locke’s labor theory.
The Hegelian “personality theory” of property also fails to sup-
port private ownership of judges’ papers.182 According to the person-
ality theory, property serves to promote individual freedom by
allowing individuals to extend their free will beyond their inner lives
to the external world through the simple process of “possessing, con-
trolling, and owning material goods.”183 Possession is critical because
it is the “means by which one embodies one’s will in an object.”184
Hegel’s personality theory, however, fails to support private owner-
ship of judicial papers. For one thing, in contrast to judges’ private
papers, such as private letters or personal diaries, judges possess judi-
cial working papers in their chambers files in their governmental
capacity. In other words, judicial papers end up in judges’ official
hands as a result of their governmental employment. This seems to
undercut the notion that judges have placed their own individual, per-
sonal free will in the papers through possession of the papers. In addi-
tion, according to Hegelian theory, gaining ownership over a thing via
mere possession is possible only if the object is “not already owned by
another.”185 With respect to judicial papers, it could be argued that
the papers are already owned by others, such as the government.
Third, the social obligation theory of property, which was
recently embraced by Gregory Alexander,186 might be used to justify
restrictions on judges’ use and disposition of their papers while none-
theless treating them as privately owned.187 This is because the social
obligation theory of property holds that all individuals have an obliga-
tion to others in their respective communities to promote the capabili-
ties that are essential to human flourishing.188 The problem here,
however, is that the social obligation theory focuses on justifying the
181 Cf. id. (“In the case of presidential papers, both the labor and the object of the labor
are arguably owned by the public and not the possessor.”).
182 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 179, at 57 (noting that Hegelian property
theory focuses “on the ways in which property contributes to development of the self, or
personality”).
183 Id. at 61.
184 Id. at 63.
185 Id. 
186 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009) (discussing the social obligation norm).
187 Cf. id. at 794–95 (noting that the social obligation theory might be used to justify
imposing restrictions on a private property owner; for example, requiring a property owner
to maintain the aesthetic and historical integrity of historical landmark buildings, such as
Penn Central).
188 Id. at 768 (affirming this obligation).
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imposition of social obligations on privately owned property—not on
the threshold question of whether property should be private to begin
with. For the reasons already described, private ownership simply
does not make sense in the context of judicial papers given that the
papers are created by government officials in the course of performing
their official government duties.
Finally, today’s leading property theory—utilitarianism—also
fails to support a private ownership model for judicial papers.
Utilitarianism seeks a socially efficient use of property by assessing
the “goodness or badness of consequences in terms of their tendency
to maximize utility or welfare.”189 Utilitarianism “do[es] not automati-
cally favor public ownership claims because private ownership may be
the most socially efficient approach in a given area.”190 However, in
the context of judicial papers, the utilitarian theory would seem to
favor public, not private, ownership. This is because the private own-
ership model has led to the destruction and loss of many historically
valuable judicial papers, particularly the papers of lower federal court
judges.191 In addition, although private ownership could be said to
protect judicial independence and candor, the private ownership
model also arguably has harmed the judiciary’s confidentiality, legiti-
macy, and collegiality when papers have been released shortly after a
judge or Justice’s retirement. Hence, the private ownership model—
which privileges the interests of individual judges—could be said to
have produced an inefficient result for society when viewed through a
utilitarian lens.192
In short, modern property theories do not support treating judi-
cial papers as private property. Nor does the unique position of the
judiciary counsel in favor of treating judicial papers as privately
owned while presidential papers are treated as government property.
Indeed, nothing other than historical happenstance counsels in favor
of continuing to treat judicial working papers as a species of private
property but presidential papers as government property.193
189 ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 179, at 11.
190 Turley, supra note 17, at 715.
191 See supra Part I.B (discussing the spotty record of preservation with respect to judi-
cial papers).
192 Cf. Turley, supra note 17, at 719 (arguing that the private model of ownership gov-
erning presidential papers “created a highly inefficient result for society throughout U.S.
history”).
193 It is interesting to note that records created by federal executive agencies, like presi-
dential papers, are viewed as public property that must be retained. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R.
§ 1222.12(c) (2012) (describing working files, “such as preliminary drafts and rough notes,
and other similar materials,” that must be maintained); id. § 1222.20 (excluding personal
files, such as private, non-agency correspondence, from official agency records); see also id.
§ 1220.18 (“Personal files . . . are documentary materials belonging to an individual that are
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B. The Private Ownership Model’s Ineffectual Balancing of
Competing Interests
The proprietary theory of ownership governing judicial papers
also is problematic because it is not well equipped to balance the
many competing interests surrounding judicial papers in a collabora-
tive or concerted manner. Cutting in favor of preservation and disclo-
sure are historical interests as well as concerns about promoting
governmental accountability, oversight, transparency, and public
knowledge. Counseling against disclosure (or at least against prema-
ture disclosure) are serious concerns about protecting litigants as well
as the judiciary’s independence, integrity, confidentiality, and collegi-
ality. The current private ownership model leaves judges free to bal-
ance these and other competing interests on their own, regardless of
whether a judge’s own individual balancing will threaten broader insti-
tutional, historical, or societal interests.
1. Interests Favoring Access
A variety of interests weigh in favor of preserving federal judges’
papers. Chief among these is the public’s interest in preserving his-
tory—the history of the judiciary’s decisionmaking process, the his-
tory of individuals who have served in the judiciary, the history behind
cases and social movements, the administrative history of the judi-
ciary, and the history of the judiciary’s relationship to society as a
whole.194 Judges’ papers help to preserve history because they contain
a veritable treasure trove of information about the judicial decision-
making process, about particular cases, and about particular judges.
For example, when Justice Harry Blackmun’s papers were
opened, the papers “releas[ed] a trove of material from 24 years of
internal deliberations at the U.S. Supreme Court on issues such as
capital punishment, school prayer and especially abortion.”195 His
papers also included memoranda written by former law clerks,
including now-Justice Elena Kagan—in fact, some of those memos
not used to conduct agency business. Personal files are excluded from the definition of
Federal records and are not owned by the Government.” (emphasis added)).
194 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 40 (noting that destruction of judicial
papers “inevitably makes more difficult our understanding of the Court and impoverishes
the record of the nation’s past”); see also Presentation of the Historical Society of the D.C.
Circuit, supra note 67, at 29 (statement of George W. Jones, Jr., Chair, Archival
Preservation Historical Society Committee) (“[W]hat the historians are looking for is any-
thing that sheds light on the way judges do their work . . . as district court, court of appeals,
or Supreme Court, and the functioning of institutions in America at various points in
time . . . .”).
195 Fred Barbash, Blackmun’s Papers Shed Light into Court; Justice’s Trove Opened by
Library of Congress, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2004, at A1.
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subsequently came to be at issue during Justice Kagan’s confirmation
process.196 In addition, Justice Blackmun’s papers revealed that
“Blackmun was convinced that Roe was doomed when a court
majority led by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist appeared ready to
effectively overrule Roe and had a draft opinion already in hand.”197
According to the papers, “[t]he day was saved, from Blackmun’s point
of view, by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and David H. Souter, who
worked successfully behind the scenes to help persuade an anguished
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy to abandon the Rehnquist majority in
Planned Parenthood [v.] Casey.”198 Blackmun’s papers even con-
tained the note Justice Kennedy sent him to tell him he was switching
sides.199
Similarly, when Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers were opened
to the public, they revealed a wealth of information about cases only
recently decided by the Court and also about the other Justices who
were still sitting on the Court.200 Journalists and researchers sifted
through the papers, which consisted of more than 173,000 items span-
ning Marshall’s twenty-four-year career on the Court,201 and the news
media ran article after article parsing the papers and providing an
extraordinary glimpse of the behind-the-scenes evolution of cases
involving issues ranging from abortion to civil rights.202 Among other
things, Justice Marshall’s papers revealed that the Court had come so
close to overruling its seminal abortion precedent, Roe v. Wade,203 in
1989 “that three Justices already had prepared an angry dissent.”204 In
addition, his papers showed that the Court’s 1989 decision striking
down laws prohibiting flag burning came “right down to the wire” and
ultimately rested in the hands of Justice Harry Blackmun, who cast
the determinative fifth vote just two days before the opinion was
196 See Presentation of the Historical Society of the D.C. Circuit, supra note 67, at 15–16
(statement of George W. Jones, Jr., Chair, Archival Preservation Historical Society
Committee); see also Mark Sherman & Jessica Gresko, Kagan Clerking Notes May Draw
GOP Fire, BOSTON GLOBE (May 26, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/
2010/05/26/kagan_memos_as_justice_marshalls_clerk_may_draw_gop_fire.
197 Barbash, supra note 195.
198 Id.
199 Id. 
200 See Lewis, supra note 21 (noting that the release of Justice Marshall’s papers soon
after his retirement was a rare event because it revealed near-current information).
201 See id. (noting the breadth of the materials released); see also Weiser & Biskupic,
supra note 21 (asserting that the papers released were “extensive”).
202 See id. (noting that the papers included notes on internal debates and preliminary
votes in a variety of cases).
203 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
204 See Supreme Court Nearly Overturned Roe, Newspaper Reports, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 24, 1993, available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1993/Supreme-Court-Nearly-
Overturned-Roe-Newspaper-Reports/id-6452a17b969d5eacb3bdd68fe24aaeb3.
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issued.205 On the more lighthearted side, his papers also showed that
memoranda were flying between the Justices at one point about the
correct spelling of the word “marijuana.”206
Numerous books and articles ranging from biographies to institu-
tional histories have benefited from these kinds of historical insights
and details that have been discovered in judicial papers.207 These
scholarly works have shaped, among other things, what the public
knows about specific judges and Justices, what we understand about
the judiciary’s relationship to societal movements and societal change,
what we understand about the fragility of some judicial decisions, and
how Americans perceive the judicial decisionmaking process and the
judiciary’s legitimacy. Although many different examples could be dis-
cussed, four illustrative examples suffice to demonstrate the rich his-
torical value that scholars and journalists have found in judicial
papers.
Polly Price’s biography of Judge Richard S. Arnold, who sat on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, made a crucial con-
tribution to the public’s understanding of the lower courts. Price relied
in part upon Judge Arnold’s papers, which included case files per-
taining to school desegregation in Little Rock—cases that never made
it to the U.S. Supreme Court but are nonetheless historically signifi-
cant.208 Price also discovered that Judge Arnold’s files included corre-
spondence between members of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit who decided Carhart v. Stenberg,209 an important case
involving partial-birth abortion that was later appealed to the
205 Weiser & Biskupic, supra note 21.
206 Mauro, supra note 21.
207 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Foreword to DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY:
GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA, at x–xi (2012) (noting that Dorsen made use of Judge
Friendly’s case files and correspondence in researching his book); MIMI CLARK
GRONLUND, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE TOM C. CLARK: A LIFE OF SERVICE, at xviii (2010)
(noting that Gronlund relied upon papers of Justice Clark found at the University of
Texas); KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 44–48 (2009) (noting
that the Justices’ internal papers shed light on the “politics of coalition building and vote
trading” that occur in bankruptcy cases); POLLY J. PRICE, JUDGE RICHARD S. ARNOLD: A
LEGACY OF JUSTICE ON THE FEDERAL BENCH 16 (2009) (noting the importance of Judge
Arnold’s papers to the writing of Price’s book); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, HARRY A.
BLACKMUN: THE OUTSIDER JUSTICE, at xiii (2008) (noting that the author relied in part on
the papers of Justices Blackmun, Black, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Powell);
Dickson, supra note 14, at xxvi (noting that the book incorporates the edited notes and
papers of multiple Justices); Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Landmark That Wasn’t:
A First Amendment Play in Five Acts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013) (noting that the
authors drew “heavily on . . . unpublished internal papers from the chambers of Justice
William Brennan and other Justices”).
208 See PRICE, supra note 207, at 13, 16 (noting the range of cases presided over by
Arnold and described in the book on the basis of his papers and other research).
209 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999).
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Supreme Court.210 Using insights gleaned from Judge Arnold’s cham-
bers papers as well as interviews and other sources, Price helped
demonstrate that while many scholars focus their attention on the
Supreme Court, it is actually lower federal courts that are far more
important to regular Americans—if only because the percentage of
cases that make it all the way to the Supreme Court is miniscule.211
Price noted, for example, that Judge Arnold “decided more abortion
cases than any single Supreme Court justice,” and he “considered
hundreds of appeals from men facing the death penalty, ninety of
whom were executed during his tenure.”212 Yet despite the impor-
tance of judges like Judge Arnold—and the role they play in pro-
tecting rights guaranteed by the Constitution—“most Americans are
unaware of the day-to-day work of judges in the traditional forum for
recognition of civil rights in the United States.”213 By drawing atten-
tion to Judge Arnold’s role in deciding issues of national importance
ranging from abortion to desegregation to the death penalty, Price
illuminated the work of one judge in our legal system in a way that
was accessible to the American people and, in the end, likely
enhanced the legitimacy of the judiciary.
Linda Greenhouse’s recent biography of Justice Harry Blackmun
provides a second illustrative example of a scholarly work that
benefitted from details revealed in judicial papers.214 The biography—
which relies almost exclusively upon the private and official papers of
Justice Harry Blackmun—sheds light on the Court’s handling of abor-
tion, the death penalty, and sex discrimination cases during
Blackmun’s tenure.215 In reviewing Blackmun’s papers, Greenhouse
found that Blackmun had left the country a “great gift” when he
donated his papers—a treasure trove of historical sources that
“[a]nyone interested in the Supreme Court during the last quarter of
the twentieth century will turn to [for] many generations to come.”216
For example, Justice Blackmun’s papers shed light on how the Justice
struggled to deal with the divisive discourse and criticism that resulted
from the Court’s abortion decision in Roe v. Wade, which he
authored.217 His papers also shed light on how the Court adapted to
210 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
211 PRICE, supra note 207, at 11–12.
212 Id. at 13.
213 Id. at 14.
214 GREENHOUSE, supra note 96, at xi (2005) (noting that Greenhouse relied on
Blackmun’s papers in authoring this book).
215 Id. at xiii.
216 Id. at xi, xiii.
217 Id. at 136–38 (discussing the public response to the decision and the continuing dis-
cussion of it within the Court).
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the confirmation of the Court’s first female member, Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, who joined the Court in 1981.218 Specifically,
Blackmun’s files showed that prior to O’Connor joining the Court,
Blackmun objected to dropping the Court’s traditional reference to
“Mr. Justice” and replacing it with the gender-neutral term
“Justice,”219 thereby shedding light on how the Court reacted to
changes in gender roles in society.
A book published in 2001 by Del Dickson provides a third
example of scholars’ reliance on the historical materials found in
judges’ and Justices’ working papers. Dickson’s book presents edited
and annotated versions of conference notes relating to approximately
300 major cases preserved among the papers of eight Justices who
served on the U.S. Supreme Court between 1940 and 1985,220
including papers relating to historically significant cases such as
Korematsu v. United States,221 Loving v. Virginia,222 and Brown v.
Board of Education.223 The papers that Dickson compiled help to
shed light on the Court’s decisionmaking process, demonstrating that
the Court’s decisions are not all about law and precedent but rather
“are an intricate and shifting composite of law, politics, policy, prin-
ciple, efficiency, expedience, pragmatism, dogmatism, reason, passion,
detachment, individual personality, group psychology, institutional
forces, and external pressures.”224 Thus, the papers help to give
scholars and the American public a better understanding of what
drives judicial decisions and what process is used to reach judicial
decisions.
Finally, yet another excellent example of the value of judicial
papers can be found in an article titled The Landmark that Wasn’t: A
First Amendment Play in Five Acts, which was recently published in
the Washington Law Review and written by Lee Levine and Stephen
Wermiel.225 The article relies on internal, previously unpublished
Court memos from the Brennan papers to reveal how the 1964
landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan226 was once in
serious jeopardy of being overruled.227 Specifically, the article demon-
strates that the Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
218 Id. at 141.
219 Id. 
220 Dickson, supra note 14.
221 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
222 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
223 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
224 Dickson, supra note 14, at xxvii.
225 See Levine & Wermiel, supra note 207, at 11.
226 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
227 See Levine & Wermiel, supra note 207, at 11.
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case from 1985,228 which is often viewed as containing only minor
First Amendment refinements, actually “is more significant than most
think, not for its formal holding but rather for the internal doubts
some of the Justices harbored between 1983 and 1985 concerning the
soundness of the rule announced in New York Times v. Sullivan.”229
In relying on previously unpublished, internal court documents (which
are now posted and linked on the Washington Law Review’s web-
site),230 Levine and Wermiel “evaluate the import of the strikingly
candid and sometimes surprising private thoughts” of several Justices,
and show readers the Justices’ “analytical volleying back and forth,
their strategic wrangling for votes, and even the input of the law clerks
as the reason and result of the case hang in the balance.”231 Not only
does the article thus provide an informative glimpse into the deci-
sional process at the Court, but it also illuminates the meaning of the
Greenmoss case and demonstrates the fragility of the Court’s seminal
ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan. Accordingly, the article
advances our understanding of both the Court’s decisionmaking pro-
cess as well as the Court’s approach to First Amendment issues.
As these illustrative examples of scholarly works demonstrate,
although the historical value of judicial papers may not have been
obvious at the beginning of our country’s history, awareness of the
historical value of judicial papers has mounted over time.232 Evidence
of this awareness can also be found in various statements made by the
judiciary. For example, a document prepared by the library of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit notes that “[j]udges’ papers
are an invaluable primary source of information on judicial biography
and court history, providing insight not otherwise available. They con-
stitute a veritable gold mine for legal scholars, biographers, and the
general public.”233 Specifically, the document from the Eighth Circuit
points out that the papers of federal judges can be helpful in three
contexts: biographical studies, institutional histories, and general
studies of legal history.234 Similarly, a guide to the preservation of
228 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
229 Ronald Collins, Academic Highlight: Internal Memos of Greenmoss Case Reveal
Doubts About Sullivan Ruling, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2013/04/academic-highlight-internal-memos-of-greenmoss-case-reveal-
doubts-about-sullivan-ruling/.
230 Interactive Article Links to Original Supreme Court Documents, WASH. L. REV.,
http://www.law.washington.edu/WLR/Issues/FeaturedArticles/mar13.aspx (last visited
Sept. 6, 2013).
231 Collins, supra note 229.
232 See SAX, supra note 18, at 94 (“[D]uring the last half-century at least, the historical
value of the justices’ working papers has been widely recognized.”).
233 See Eighth Circuit Preservation Guide, supra note 69.
234 Id. 
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federal judges’ papers prepared by the Federal Judicial Center notes
that scholars of the courts see the significant historical value in the
materials and “recognize the unique perspective offered” in a judge’s
papers.235 Accordingly, historical interests clearly are one of the iden-
tifiable factors leaning in favor of preservation of federal judges’
working papers.
In addition to historical interests, the public’s interest in govern-
mental transparency, accountability, and disclosure also supports
public access to federal judges’ papers.236 Certainly, the judiciary
“isn’t subject to popular control in the same way that the legislature
and executive branch are,”237 given that federal judges enjoy lifetime
tenure and salary protections and do not run for elected office.238
However, the judiciary has taken steps recently to make its actions
more accessible to and transparent to the American public. For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court recently began releasing audio files
of all oral arguments at the end of each argument week,239 and the
lower federal courts have recently piloted cameras in some court-
rooms.240 These small steps toward opening up the judicial process
seem to be reflective of the general notion that there is nothing sacred
about the judiciary that should prevent the public from receiving an
“accounting of how the Court functions and how it reaches its deci-
sions.”241 Indeed, the fact that judges are relatively unaccountable
235 FJC GUIDE, supra note 16, at 3. The guide stresses the historical value of judges’
papers, provides a “how to” on preserving judges’ papers, and highlights issues that judges
should think about if they choose to donate their papers to a repository. Id. at 1–2.
236 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 6 (noting that information “is a neces-
sary basis of responsible government, without which the claims of popular sovereignty
cannot be realized”); RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at ix (noting James
Madison’s views that “[a] popular Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both”).
237 Transcript: Documents and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel Discussion Moderated
by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL
OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 213 (statement of Sidney Fine, Professor of History,
University of Michigan).
238 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
239 See Argument Audio, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (July 7, 2013),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio.aspx (“Prior to the 2010
Term, the recordings from one Term of Court were not available until the beginning of the
next Term.”).
240 See Courts Selected for Federal Cameras in Court Pilot Study, UNITED STATES
COURTS (June 8, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-06-08/Courts_
Selected_for_Federal_Cameras_in_Court_Pilot_Study.aspx (describing the camera pilot
program).
241 Transcript: Documents and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel Discussion Moderated
by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL
OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 213 (statement of Sidney Fine, Professor of History,
University of Michigan).
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while in office might suggest that it is even more imperative that
judges be made accountable to history, at least eventually.242 Without
an opportunity for public scrutiny, the fear is that “anonymous hands
may become irresponsible hands.”243
Judge Richard S. Arnold seems to have subscribed to this view.
According to Judge Arnold’s biographer, Polly J. Price, Judge Arnold
“knew that continued public acceptance of the federal courts was a
fragile thing, easily jeopardized by individual behavior.”244 He was
aware that the future of the judiciary “depended upon continued
public acceptance of the judiciary,” and he provided Price with access
to his papers before his death to further the public’s access to the
actions he took as a judge.245
Sidney Fine, a professor of history, took a similar position in
favor of greater judicial disclosure and accountability during a panel
discussion held in 1976 at Yale University as part of the National
Study Commission’s hearings on judicial records when he stated:
I can’t see why, assuming some protection for people on the Court,
there is something sacred about a judicial decision, more sacred
than a presidential decision. After all, presidential decisions may
lead to an act of war in which millions of people are killed, and yet
we say we have a right to rake that over. Why in a democracy
should the public be denied knowledge of the judicial process, the
way in which opinions are created? An opinion like Brown v. Board
of Education had enormous impact on every living American. Why
should it be a secret to us how that decision was reached?246
By this account, disclosure of judicial papers could help to disci-
pline and improve the work of judges and Justices who—although
they enjoy lifetime tenure and are not subject to popular control via
elections—care about their reputations and about the judiciary’s
242 See Walter F. Murphy, The Judicial Process and Judicial Papers: Of Privacy,
Prospects, Accountability and Understanding, in RECORDS ON MICROFICHE OF THE
NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION ON RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS,
No. 38, at 2–4 (“[I]f it is improper to judge judges immediately, it is all the more necessary
to judge them thoroughly when the proper time eventually arrives.”); id. at 3 (noting that
holding judges accountable requires an examination of not merely “the final products of
their work—their decisions and opinions—but also the processes by which they arrived at
those results”).
243 Cahn, supra note 122, at 15.
244 PRICE, supra note 207, at 16.
245 Id. (“Prior to his death Arnold granted me access [to his papers], along with several
hours of interviews.”).
246 Transcript: Documents and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel Discussion Moderated
by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL
OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 219 (statement of Sidney Fine, Professor of History,
University of Michigan).
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image and legitimacy in the public’s eyes.247 For example, if judges
know that their records will be subject to eventual public scrutiny,
they might well be even more careful to avoid making improper com-
ments, such as discriminatory statements like the one Justice Jackson
made when he noted that Justice Frankfurter’s Jewish faith might
“grate on Southern sensibilities.”248 They also would likely be even
more mindful to adhere carefully to the rule of law when deciding
cases since their actions would ultimately be judged by history, and
they might take greater care to communicate with their colleagues
with civility if they knew that others outside the Court ultimately
would be able to read the communications.
Disclosure of judicial papers also could help to discipline the
work of judicial law clerks who, unlike their bosses, do not enjoy life-
time tenure. If law clerks know that what they write may well be
revealed to the public down the road, then they too may take greater
care in ensuring that their recommendations adhere to the law rather
than to their own personal preferences and that anything they write is
carefully considered and well-reasoned. A memo written by a law
clerk in 1952 about Plessy v. Ferguson provides perhaps the best
example of how the release of judicial papers can render former law
clerks accountable long after they clerk.249 In the 1952 memo, the law
clerk, William H. Rehnquist, wrote: “I realize it is an unpopular and
unhumanitarian position, for which I have been excoriated by ‘liberal’
colleagues, but I think Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be re-
affirmed.”250 The memo later came back to haunt Rehnquist in 1971
on the eve of his Senate floor debate on his nomination to the
Supreme Court.251
2. Interests Weighing Against Access
Despite the various interests that counsel in favor of access to
judicial papers, many other countervailing interests pull in the other
direction—or at least counsel against immediate or premature disclo-
sure of working papers. Among these interests is the judiciary’s
interest in protecting its independence, which has its roots in the U.S.
Constitution’s grant of lifetime tenure and salary protections to
247 Cf. WIGDOR, supra note 18, at 8 (“Since Justices are appointed for life and not sub-
ject to popular control through the ballot, . . . their sole constraints are the threat of
impeachment and concern for their reputation.”).
248 See Cahn, supra note 122, at 15.
249 Liptak, supra note 87.
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
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Article III judges.252 Some have asserted that public access to judicial
working papers would “weaken judicial independence by subjecting
the judge to demagogical pressure”253 and “tend to politicize the judi-
cial function, cheapen the process, and subject the independence of
the judiciary to a very real threat.”254
Related to concerns about judicial independence are concerns
about preserving the judiciary’s collegiality, confidentiality, and integ-
rity. For example, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who ultimately donated
his papers to Washington and Lee University,255 once wrote about the
need for confidentiality and candor in the Court’s decisionmaking
process, noting:
The integrity of judicial decision making would be impaired seri-
ously if we had to reach our judgments in the atmosphere of an
ongoing town meeting. There must be candid discussion, a willing-
ness to consider arguments advanced by other Justices, and a
continuing examination and re-examination of one’s own views. The
confidentiality of this process assures that we will review carefully
the soundness of our judgments. It also improves the quality of our
written opinions.256
Similarly, during hearings held in the 1970s by the National Study
Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials, Judge
James Oakes of the Second Circuit argued that “[p]ublic access to
judicial materials would serve, on an appellate level, to inhibit free
discussion among the participating judges, chill exploration of uncon-
ventional or uncharted areas of law, and generally delay the opera-
tions of a system already strained by a number of extraneous
factors.”257
In addition to the potential chilling effect that release of judicial
papers could have, there is also reason to worry that the public airing
of a judge’s “dirty laundry”—while promoting transparency and ena-
bling greater oversight and accountability—could unnecessarily tar-
nish or embarrass the judiciary’s reputation.258 This concern, for
252 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
253 Testimony Received in Public Hearings, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra
note 14, at 265, 266 (statement of James L. Oakes, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit).
254 Id.
255 See supra note 88.
256 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., What Really Goes On at the Supreme Court, in JUDGES ON
JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 84 (David M. O’Brien ed., 1997).
257 Testimony Received in Public Hearings, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra
note 14, at 265, 266 (statement of James L. Oakes, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit).
258 But see Dickson, supra note 14, at xxvii (noting that the Justices “rarely allude to
personal antagonisms or conference infighting in their notes” and suggesting that those
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example, was raised in the wake of Alpheus Mason’s publication of a
biography of Chief Justice Stone.259 Specifically, in an article called
Eavesdropping on Justice, Edmond Cahn asserted in 1957 that some
of the revelations in the Stone biography, which were based on
internal working papers from the Court, “will surely cause unneces-
sary embarrassment.”260 To support this claim, Cahn pointed out that
the biography revealed that Justice Jackson had argued in an internal
Court memorandum that a case involving racial discrimination in
Texas should not be written by Justice Felix Frankfurter “because,
among other objections, he is a Jew, a circumstance which ‘may grate
on Southern sensibilities.’”261 Some might argue that these sorts of
details should be publicly revealed so as to enable greater oversight of
the judiciary; Cahn seemed more concerned about the harm and
embarrassment that such revelations could cause to the judiciary as an
institution.
Furthermore, there are concerns that judges’ working papers may
not actually “provide a full or objective account” and may be unreli-
able.262 For example, some working papers may provide only partial,
half-complete information that presents a skewed view of what actu-
ally happened during the judicial decisionmaking process, or the
papers might include details that were designed to make the judge or
Justice look good in the light of history. These worries about the accu-
racy and reliability of papers might be seen as undercutting the histor-
ical value of the papers. However, one study, which examined papers
from Justices Earl Warren, William Douglas, William Brennan, and
Thurgood Marshall for the 1967 and 1968 Terms, found that the
Justices’ records are indeed substantially accurate and reliable.263
Accordingly, concerns about the accuracy and reliability of judicial
papers may well be overblown.264
Finally, yet another interest counseling against disclosure of judi-
cial papers—or at least against immediate disclosure—is the
“who enjoy salacious gossip about the Court may be somewhat disappointed by what they
read”).
259 See Cahn, supra note 122, at 15 (discussing Mason’s biography of Stone).
260 Id.
261 Id. 
262 Dickson, supra note 14, at xxv (“Conference notes . . . do not provide a full or objec-
tive account of how or why the Justices decided cases as they did. . . . They are neither
complete nor objective transcripts but are a partial record of what interested the note-
taker at the time.”).
263 See Forrest Maltzman and Paul J. Wahlbeck, Inside the U.S. Supreme Court: The
Reliability of the Justices’ Conference Records, 58 J. POL. 528 (1996).
264 Cf. Dickson, supra note 14, at xxv–xxvi (discussing the limitations of the Justices’
papers).
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judiciary’s and litigants’ interest in the finality of judgments.265 If judi-
cial papers involving specific cases were opened up soon after a case
was decided, then the finality of the decision might well be called into
question by unhappy litigants,266 who could comb the papers in an
attempt to find a basis for seeking to have the judgment set aside.267
As one judge noted during the National Study Commission’s hearings
on public records in the 1970s, “it would be awful if a big case were
decided and the conference notes were made available a year later,
and the losing party wants to come in and reopen because Judge X
was under a misapprehension on a fact, and so forth.”268
Alternatively, litigants might well seek to use evidence gleaned
from judicial papers as evidence of the authoritative meaning of judi-
cial precedents—akin to how legislative history is often used to show
the meaning of statutes passed by Congress.269 This would open up a
variety of thorny questions regarding whether or not judicial papers
and judicial history should be legally admissible to prove the meaning
of judicial texts.270 Although arguments could be made that it would
265 Transcript: Documents and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel Discussion Moderated
by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL
OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 218 (statement of J. Edward Lumbard, Jr., J., U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit) (noting that “we have very firmly rooted in the Anglo-
American tradition, that there has to be a finality to judicial decisions,” and that courts
should not “attempt to set aside what has been done after the full and due process of law,
unless, of course, there be discovery of some criminal act or fraud or something of that
sort”).
266 Cf. State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft, 619 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio 1993) (rejecting defendant’s
attempt on a writ of mandamus to seek the notes that the judge made during the defen-
dant’s murder trial); Beuhler v. Small, 64 P.3d 78 (Wash. 2003) (holding that an attorney
had no right to seek access to a judge’s computer files under state public records laws);
State v. Pankin, 579 N.W.2d 52 (Wisc. 1998) (holding that defendant in Wisconsin seeking
postconviction relief had no right under state law to access the sentencing court judge’s
personal notes).
267 A litigant might, for example, try to bring a direct attack against the judgment using
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (providing that “[o]n
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for” a variety of reasons,
including mistake or “any other reason justifying relief”).
268 Transcript: Documents and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel Discussion Moderated
by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL
OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 236 (statement of Carl McGowan, J., U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit).
269 See Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1311–12 (considering whether judicial history, such
as internal drafts of Supreme Court opinions, should be legally admissible when inter-
preting the meaning of a judicial precedent).
270 If courts were of the view that judicial papers should not be allowed to be introduced
to prove the meaning of a judicial precedent, then the courts could fairly easily solve the
problem by developing a formal evidentiary rule that prevents the admissibility of judicial
history—akin to how Rule 606 of the Federal Rules of Evidence prevents evidence relating
to jurors’ thought processes from being used to impeach a jury verdict. See FED. R. EVID.
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be helpful to have this kind of judicial history available for use in deci-
phering the meaning of judicial precedents (just as legislative history
is used in interpreting the meaning of statutes), the arguments are
complex,271 and under current practices, judicial history is not admis-
sible to prove the legal meaning of a judicial opinion.272
In short, there are many different competing interests at play
when it comes to judicial papers: On the one hand, tipping in favor of
preservation, there are historical interests and the public’s interest in
accountability, transparency, disclosure, and oversight. On the other
hand, tipping against disclosure (or at least premature disclosure),
there are serious concerns about protecting the judiciary’s indepen-
dence, collegiality, confidentiality, and integrity as well as protecting
litigants and the finality of judicial decisions.
3. The Desirability of Collective Rather than Individualized
Calculations
Rather than calling for collaborative or collective thinking about
how best to balance the many competing interests surrounding judicial
papers, the current ad hoc approach used to deal with judicial papers
leaves each judge free to come up with his or her own answer. Put
more simply, the private ownership model allows individual interests
to trump broader institutional or societal interests. This seems quite
problematic when one considers that many of the competing interests
at stake involve interests that are much broader than any one judge or
any one Justice. Indeed, many of the interests go to the very heart of
the judiciary’s institutional integrity and independence as well as to
the public’s broad interests in preserving history and holding our gov-
ernment accountable.273
Take, for example, Justice David Souter or Justice Warren
Burger’s decisions to delay the release of their papers for decades.274
Their decisions do not necessarily represent what is in the best inter-
ests of the public at large or historians, but rather represent their own
606(b)(1) (“[A] juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred
during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote;
or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.”).
271 See Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1313–16 (exploring the complex arguments sur-
rounding whether or not judicial history should be used as an interpretive source).
272 See id. at 1313.
273 Cf. E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. & Allen R. Snyder, Breaching Secrecy at the Supreme
Court—An Institutional or Individual Decision?, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., June 12, 1978, at
6–7 (suggesting that the most appropriate answer to the question of how to handle judicial
papers “is not necessarily one for individual decision but rather may be an institutional
one” because such a decision “affects all members of the Court and the integrity of their
views in regard to each case”).
274 See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
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individualized decision.275 Similarly, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s deci-
sion to allow his papers to be released immediately upon his death
merely represented his own calculation about how best to mediate the
competing interests at play.276 Indeed, a majority of Justices then on
the Court affirmatively opposed the Library of Congress’s decision to
provide researchers with access to Justice Marshall’s papers so soon
after he left the bench.277 As these examples illustrate, the current
private ownership model creates the possibility that individual, private
interests will prevail over broader institutional or societal interests as
well as the interests of individual litigants and other judges.
Hence, our continued adherence to the private ownership model
governing judicial papers seems problematic, both under leading
property theories and as a matter of policy, since it has proven ill-
equipped to balance the interests of individual judges against the
interests of society as a whole.278 We need a more uniform approach
for handling judicial papers—one that moves toward a public owner-
ship model. It is to the question of precisely how to achieve such a
shift that this Article now turns.
III
MOVING FORWARD: HOW TO ACHIEVE A SHIFT FROM A
PRIVATE TO A PUBLIC OWNERSHIP MODEL FOR
JUDICIAL PAPERS
In considering how a shift from private to public ownership might
most appropriately be achieved, there are several questions to con-
sider. For example, should the legislature or the courts set the rules
for judicial papers? What sorts of matters would the rules need to
address? What factors would need to be taken into account in order to
advance society’s broad interests in preserving papers of historical
value and gaining access to information while at the same time
275 An editorial published in the Washington Post noted this tremendous power that our
current system places in the hands of individual Justices, arguing the following in the wake
of Justice Souter’s decision to close his papers for fifty years: “[T]he absence of guidelines
leaves individual justices with far too much power to determine the fate of records that the
public rightly has a claim to. After all, justices are public servants and are paid with public
dollars.” Safeguarding History, supra note 62.
276 See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text (discussing the release of Marshall’s
papers).
277 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
278 This argument in favor of a collective rather than individual balancing does not nec-
essarily answer the question of who should set uniform rules for judges’ papers—that is,
Congress or the judiciary as a whole. That question is addressed infra Part III.B.1, which
argues in favor of delegating authority to the judiciary to set uniform rules concerning
access to and disposition of judges’ papers.
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protecting litigants and the judiciary? This Part addresses these and
other questions in an attempt to map a possible path forward.
A. Learning from the Past: The National Study Commission’s
1977 Report
In thinking about the most promising approach, it makes sense to
start by learning from the past. Specifically, it is valuable to take a
careful look at the conclusions and recommendations set forth in the
1977 report compiled by the National Study Commission—a report
that has long been overlooked.279
In particular, the National Study Commission’s conclusions are
worth careful reconsideration because they were made after studying
and taking into account the views of various experts, including federal
judges and academics.280 The Commission itself, for instance, included
one representative from the judiciary—Judge J. Edward Lumbard, Jr.,
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.281 In addition,
the Commission received testimony or written statements from a
variety of federal judges, including Judge Gerhard A. Gesell of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Judge J. Skelly
Wright of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
279 In addition to looking to the National Study Commission’s report, it also makes
sense to look to the states to see if any of their practices shed light on how best to regulate
judicial papers. Unfortunately, however, the states—like the federal government—gener-
ally have failed to give serious attention to the issue of who should own judges’ papers.
What little attention states have given to judicial papers generally has focused on whether
internal court records should be open to public access. See, e.g., MO. CT. OP. R. 8.02(N)
(excluding internal court records from public access provisions); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 2
(same); N.J. R. CT. 1:38-3(b) (same); Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d
841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that preliminary drafts, personal notes and rough
records created by judges are not subject to public inspection because “[m]uch more harm
would be done to the judicial process by requiring this . . . material to be available to the
public, than would ever be overborne by any benefit the public might derive thereby”);
State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft, 619 N.E.2d 688, 689 (Ohio 1993) (“A trial judge’s personal
handwritten notes made during the course of a trial are not public records.”). However, at
least two states have expressly called for the retention of judicial working papers. First, in
Maine, a judicial order provides that the information contained in judges’ and law clerks’
notes, including draft documents and communications between judges and clerks, is to be
retained in court files but marked as “confidential.” ME. ADMIN. ORDER JB-05-20 (2009).
Requests for access to the confidential materials must be made by “motion with notice to
all parties of record” as provided by various state rules. Id. Second, in Florida, rules gov-
erning the judicial branch’s records provide that “memoranda, drafts or other documents
involved in a court’s judicial decision-making process” should be retained “until obsolete,
superseded or administrative value is lost.” FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN., RETENTION SCHEDULE
(June 14, 2013), available at  https://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/
Attachments/F854D695BA7136B085257316005E7DE7/$FILE/Judicial.pdf.
280 See RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at xvi–xviii (describing the
careful study that the Commission undertook).
281 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at iv.
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Judge Herbert P. Sorg of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, Judge Carl McGowan of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, and Judge James L. Oakes of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.282 The Commission
also sent a questionnaire to federal judges and polled chief judges con-
cerning current procedures for handling judicial papers.283 Notably, of
the 371 judges who responded to the Commission’s questionnaire, 222
indicated that they would be “well disposed toward guidelines to aid
them in the organization, control, and disposition of their papers.”284
Records and transcripts from the Commission’s proceedings indi-
cate that of the issues voiced during the proceedings, many reflected a
concern with protecting the judiciary’s constitutional role and inde-
pendence as well as the finality of judicial judgments.285 One commen-
tator considered whether it would be problematic to have Congress
pass legislation governing the judiciary’s papers, since Congress and
the judiciary are “separated institutions.”286 Some judges and scholars
have expressed concerns that the disclosure of judicial papers would
lead to a “chilling effect” and would hamper candid judicial delibera-
tions.287 Other qualms raised during the proceedings touched on the
significant costs of preserving judicial records288 and lingering doubts
282 See RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at xxiii (noting Commission
members); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 55–56 (same).
283 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 25 (noting a “judicial questionnaire sent
by the Commission to the Judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals”); see also
id. at 24 (noting that Judge Lumbard polled the chief judges of the courts of appeals for the
Commission).
284 Id. at 40.
285 See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 41 (noting a “need to protect the
constitutional role of the courts as imposers of final judgment”); Transcript: Documents
and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel Discussion Moderated by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor
of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 218
(statement of J. Edward Lumbard, Jr., J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit)
(discussing judicial independence and finality of judgments).
286 Murphy, supra note 242, at 18.
287 See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 41 (referencing a “chilling effect”);
Murphy, supra note 242, at 7–8 (“[T]here is room for legitimate concern that the problem
of revelation, even at some future date, of his tentative thoughts would inhibit a Justice
from candid expression of his views either at conference, by memoranda to the Court, or
by notations on slip opinions.”).
288 See Transcript: Documents and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel Discussion
Moderated by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS OF
FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 221 (statement of Gerhard A. Gesell, J., U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia) (noting that the Government Accountability
Office “has estimated there is $15 billion a year spent by the Federal Government in the
management of records”).
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as to whether judicial files would contain anything “of permanent
value.”289
After considering all of the testimony and comments that it
received, the Commission concluded that “[t]he existing system of pri-
vate custodianship of Judges’ office files has not functioned well in
terms of preserving an adequate historical record of the judicial deci-
sion-making process, of the individuals who have served on the courts,
or of the relationship of the courthouse to the larger society.”290 The
Commission’s majority report ultimately took the position that
Congress should declare judicial papers to be public property, not-
withstanding the need to protect the judiciary’s independence and its
ability to engage in full and candid deliberations.291 The Commission
suggested that Congress should do this by relying both upon its
powers enumerated in Article I of the Constitution and on Article IV,
which provides that Congress shall have the power to make rules
respecting the property of the United States.292 According to the
Commission’s recommendation, covered judicial papers should
include “documentary materials, exclusive of court records, generated
or received by Federal Judges in connection with their official duties
and retained in their files after final judgment has been entered in a
case.”293 The Commission recommended that Congress declare that
these papers be made available to citizens no more than fifteen years
after the Justice or judge leaves office; the Commission felt that this
fifteen-year period of access control would alleviate concerns about
“chilling effects” and about unduly trouncing on judicial indepen-
dence because judges themselves would have control over access to
their papers for a fifteen-year period.294 In addition, the Commission
recommended that Congress enable federal judges to choose their
289 Id. at 232 (statement of Carl McGowan, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia). But see Murphy, supra note 242, at 4 (noting that if “the information and the
understanding” gleaned from “judicial papers were to be excised from the public record
and private memories, knowledge of the Supreme Court in particular and the judicial pro-
cess in general would regress to an extent measurable only in a scale that had calibrations
of the magnitude of light years”).
290 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 39.
291 Id. at 39–41. The alternate report agreed that judicial papers should be treated as
public property and subject to disclosure; however, instead of proposing a new statute, it
proposed extending the Freedom of Information Act to the judiciary. See id. at 65, 69.
292 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting . . . Property belonging to the United
States . . . .”).
293 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 39.
294 See id. at 7 (“[T]he Commission recommends that Congress establish a mechanism
similar to that contained in the Freedom of Information Act to provide the citizen with the
legal right to access to all Public Papers at the end of the fifteen-year closure . . . .”); see
also id. at 41 (“If Judges can feel confident that materials they consider sensitive will be
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own preferred depository (whether public or private),295 and that
Congress consider a one-time federal grant to non-federal deposito-
ries to encourage adequate treatment of judicial materials.296
Finally, as to the specifics for how to implement a public owner-
ship model for judicial papers, the Commission recommended that the
Judicial Conference of the United States be empowered to promul-
gate guidelines to determine which court-related papers should be
retained. Recognizing that “there will be neither sufficient resources
nor interest in preserving all of the court-related papers of all Federal
judges,” the Commission suggested that the Judicial Conference of the
United States work in consultation with the Archivist of the United
States to develop disposition standards governing what documents
should be retained and what documents lack “important elements”
and can be culled from the collections.297
B. Toward the Future: Designing a Set of Governing Rules
Certainly the Commission’s final report provides a very useful
roadmap for how a shift to a public ownership model for judicial
papers might occur—a roadmap that should be carefully studied and
consulted in thinking about how to move toward public ownership.
However, given that it was published more than thirty-five years ago,
it is appropriate to think anew about the best way to move toward a
public ownership model in light of today’s political climate and in light
of developments that occurred after the report issued, including the
passage of the PRA, controversies that have surrounded implementa-
tion of the PRA, and recent Justices’ dispositions of their papers. This
Subpart aims to do that.
1. Who Should Make the Rules: Congress or the Courts?
The first question that arises when thinking about how to move to
a public ownership model is this: Who should be the one to regulate?
Congress? Or the courts?
On the threshold issue of declaring public ownership, it seems
that Congress would be best equipped to act. This is because over-
riding the longstanding tradition of private ownership that surrounds
judicial papers would constitute a legislative act. Indeed, it might well
protected from premature disclosure, they are far more likely to produce a full and candid
record of their judicial activities.”).
295 See id. at 40 (reporting recommendation).
296 Id. at 41.
297 See id. at 40 (reporting recommendation).
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raise Takings Clause concerns if applied retroactively.298 For example,
the D.C. Circuit held that the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act, which deemed President Nixon’s papers to be
public property, constituted a per se taking.299
It is possible that one could argue that Congress—by previously
delegating to the federal courts the power to “prescribe rules for the
conduct of their business”300—has empowered the judiciary to make
this kind of legislative call. However, it is difficult to see how this stat-
utory provision, which was intended simply to enable courts to pro-
mulgate local rules of practice and procedure,301 could be read to
enable the judiciary to effect a taking of what has historically been
judges’ private property.
Similarly, Congress’s decision in the Rules Enabling Act to grant
to the Supreme Court the power “to prescribe general rules of prac-
tice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States
district courts . . . and courts of appeals” applies by its own terms only
to rules of practice, procedure, and evidence.302 Indeed, the Rules
Enabling Act states that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.”303 Hence, it seems that there has been
no congressional delegation to the judiciary that would empower the
judiciary to take what would be a legislative act—namely, declaring
judicial papers to be public rather than private property.304 This leaves
298 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”). It might be possible to overcome takings concerns by arguing that judi-
cial papers have always been public property since they were prepared on public time
using public property and with the aide of governmental employees. However, in light of
judges’ reliance on the longstanding private ownership model, it would seem wise as a
prudential matter to avoid applying any new ownership rules retroactively—even if the
Constitution itself does not mandate the avoidance of retroactivity.
299 See Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (concluding that the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act constituted a per se taking of
former President Nixon’s property).
300 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2006).
301 See United States v. Hvass, 147 F. Supp. 594, 596 (N.D. Iowa 1956) (noting that
rulemaking grants to the federal courts “were intended only to cover matters of practice
and procedure”), rev’d on other grounds, 355 U.S. 570 (1958). See generally 35A C.J.S.
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE § 23 (2008) (“The authorization to make and amend rules
governing the practice in the district court is intended only to cover matters of practice and
procedure.”).
302 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
303 Id. § 2072(b).
304 See Judicial Papers Hearing, supra note 22, at 34–35 (pointing out that if Congress
did not act and instead the Supreme Court sought to regulate judicial papers, then the
Court’s own regulations might lack the force and effect of law and hence would not neces-
sarily bind depositories receiving judicial papers under contrary instructions from a
Justice).
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Congress as the most appropriate actor to answer the question of
ownership.305
Ownership, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Many other
questions, including the scope of coverage, the timing of release, and
ultimate disposition, would also need judicial input. With respect to
these details, Congress should make clear that judicial papers must be
made “reasonably” accessible to the public,306 but it should otherwise
empower the Judicial Conference of the United States to fill in the
details of the regulatory scheme with uniform regulations.307 This
would leave the judiciary free to set uniform rules governing the spe-
cifics, such as rules governing what papers should be kept, where they
should be deposited, and when they should be released.
There are a variety of reasons why giving the judiciary a signifi-
cant role in implementation of the move to a public ownership
model—rather than having Congress legislate with great precision—
makes sense. First, if Congress tried to legislate with great specificity,
there would likely be serious problems with achieving judicial compli-
ance, as well as serious questions about enforceability. If judges were
unhappy with the terms set by Congress, then—as one commentator
pointed out to the Commission in the 1970s—there would “be no
hope of requiring a stubborn Justice to comply” without an “FBI
agent or U.S. commissioner sitting in each Justice’s office (and per-
haps others in the offices of his secretary and clerks).”308
Our country’s experience with implementation of the PRA,
which has been a bit rocky, corroborates the significance of this con-
cern. When President Reagan’s papers—the first presidential papers
305 In deciding the question of ownership, Congress would likely want to take care to
apply the rule of public ownership only to future judicial papers. This would help to avoid
any Takings Clause claims that might apply if Congress tried to take previously created
judges’ papers and turn them into public property. Supra notes 298–99 and accompanying
text; infra note 309 and accompanying text. In addition, there are other reasons why it
might make sense for Congress to apply the move toward public ownership of judicial
papers only in a prospective manner—either only to newly appointed judges or only to
papers produced after the effective date of the statute. These additional reasons might
include, for example, the notion that judges may have relied on the old private ownership
model and that retroactive application of public ownership would upset these reliance
interests.
306 Mandating only “reasonable” access would enable the judiciary to determine the
specifics of access, such as the precise timing of access and the location of access, and thus
would help to address concerns about protecting the judiciary’s independence and separa-
tion-of-powers issues.
307 Uniformity does not necessarily imply or call for uniformity across different levels
and types of courts. See infra notes 333–36 and accompanying text. Rather, it calls for
uniform rules within each level and type of court.
308 Murphy, supra note 242, at 20.
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covered under the Act309—were set to be released, President George
W. Bush delayed the release and issued Executive Order 13,233,310
which limited “the ability of the public to access presidential docu-
ments by giving the sitting president and former presidents an effec-
tive veto over the release of their records.”311 This led to debate and
controversy312 and eventually to President Barack Obama’s revoca-
tion of Bush’s order on January 21, 2009.313 In place of the Bush
order, President Obama “substituted a less protective protocol
modeled on one established by President Reagan in 1989.”314 Under
the Obama order, “records cannot be protected by former presidents
in their sole discretion; . . . claims of executive privilege asserted by
former presidents must be submitted to the archivist for a determina-
tion, made in consultation with the attorney general, the White House
counsel, and ‘such other executive agencies as the Archivist deems
appropriate.’”315
As Bush’s attempts to cut back on and weaken the PRA indicate,
a willingness to cooperate from those being regulated would be crucial
to the success of any law seeking to regulate judicial papers. Hence,
rather than having Congress legislate with precision—like it did in the
PRA in setting a twelve-year access restriction for certain restricted
presidential documents—the safest route would be for Congress to
involve the judiciary in crafting and filling in the details of the regula-
tory scheme.
Second, unilateral Congressional action to regulate disposition of
judicial records might raise separation-of-powers issues.316 For
309 Aware of potential Takings Clause concerns, Congress took care to apply the
Presidential Records Act only to future presidents, beginning with Ronald Reagan. See
Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1277 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“In 1978, Congress
prospectively abolished presidential ownership of White House materials with the
Presidential Records Act . . . .” (emphasis added)).
310 Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001).
311 Yuhan, supra note 17, at 1570; see also Turley, supra note 17, at 653.
312 See Am. Historical Ass’n v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 402 F. Supp. 2d 171
(D.D.C. 2005) (“Plaintiffs have asked the Court to find that the president has overstepped
the limitations on his power by issuing an executive order that alters the terms of [the
Presidential Records Act].”). See generally Yuhan, supra note 17 (noting the conflict that
Bush’s order caused).
313 Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 21, 2009).
314 Eric Lane, Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. & Emily Berman, Too Big a Canon in the
President’s Arsenal: Another Look at United States v. Nixon, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 737,
783 (2010).
315 Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 § 4 (Jan. 21, 2009).
316 See Judicial Papers Hearing, supra note 22, at 2 (statement of Sen. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Member, Subcomm. on Regulation and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs) (noting Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concerns about separation-of-
powers problems that might arise if Congress tried to regulate judicial papers); id. at 4
(statement of Sen. Thad Cochran, Member, Subcomm. on Regulation and Gov’t Info. of
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example, were Congress to dictate to federal judges that they must
create and keep certain records, it might appear as if Congress were
intruding on the judiciary’s independence by telling the courts how to
do their jobs.317 Any express mandate for release of judicial papers
after a term of years would likely prompt similar objections.318 Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted as much when he wrote to Senator Joseph
Lieberman in 1993 in the wake of the release of Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s papers. Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: “[W]e
have no hesitancy in expressing the opinion that legislation [respecting
the Justices’ papers] . . . could raise difficult concerns respecting the
appropriate separation that must be maintained between the legisla-
tive branch and this Court.”319
Notably, in the context of presidential papers, these sorts of sepa-
ration-of-powers concerns have not made much headway. For
example, when former President Richard Nixon challenged the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act,320 which
applied only to President Nixon’s papers, the Supreme Court rejected
his separation-of-powers challenge.321 In addition, in a 1996 case
involving the PRA, Judge Tatel of the D.C. Circuit noted in a dis-
senting opinion that the government had not asserted that “the
Presidential Records Act represents an unconstitutional intrusion
upon the President’s exercise of his constitutional duties”—presum-
ably “in recognition of Congress’s authority to preserve documents of
the United States Government.”322
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs) (stressing the need for caution given the delicate
separation-of-powers issues that regulation of judicial papers would implicate).
317 See id. at 30 (statement of Dennis Hutchinson, Editor, Supreme Court Review)
(indicating concern that constitutional separation-of-powers issues would arise if Congress
told the Court that it must keep certain papers); cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
614 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “an Act of Congress mandating long
opinions from this Court” would be “patently unconstitutional”); Houston v. Williams, 13
Cal. 24 (1859) (rejecting power of California legislature to require state appellate courts to
give reasons for their decisions in writing).
318 But see Judicial Papers Hearing, supra note 22, at 31 (statement of E. Barrett
Prettyman, Jr., Attorney, Hogan & Hartson) (suggesting that it would be constitutional for
Congress to regulate access to judicial papers so long as a sufficient time lag is allowed to
account for the judiciary’s need for confidentiality).
319 Letter from Chief Justice William Rehnquist to Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (June 7,
1993), reprinted in Judicial Papers Hearing, supra note 22, at 71.
320 Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974).
321 See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441 (1977) (upholding the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act against a separation-of-powers
challenge).
322 Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Tatel,
J., dissenting).
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Although the Commission’s 1977 report, which predates these
various cases involving presidential records, did not give much atten-
tion to separation-of-powers questions, such concerns should not be
dismissed too readily today—especially in light of recent precedents
indicating that the Court takes threats to the judiciary’s independence
seriously.323 Even assuming arguendo that Congress has the power to
regulate the specific details of judicial papers as a constitutional
matter, the judiciary ultimately would have the final say on the consti-
tutional questions. Thus, in light of very real separation-of-powers
concerns, it would be wise for Congress to legislate in the least intru-
sive way possible.
Congress, for example, could declare something along these lines:
The United States shall reserve and retain complete ownership, pos-
session, and control of judicial records, including internal draft opin-
ions, internal correspondence, vote sheets and administrative
records and memoranda, created and retained in chambers files by
federal judges and Supreme Court justices in the course of con-
ducting official judicial business and deciding judicial matters and
cases. Such judicial records shall be administered and made reason-
ably accessible to the public in accordance with regulations promul-
gated by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Such
regulations shall seek to serve the public interest and to provide
uniform regulations to govern judicial records.
Legislation along these lines would not force judges to create any par-
ticular records. Nor would it necessarily force judges to retain any
papers; a judge could conceivably choose to discard certain records in
his or her chambers files so long as that practice was consistent with
the regulations promulgated by the Judicial Conference. Rather, the
main contribution of legislation along these lines would be to declare
public ownership of judicial papers and to prompt the judiciary to
make uniform rules deciding what papers should be retained, when
such papers should be made accessible to the public, and what terms
of access and disposition are “reasonable.”
323 See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (holding that bankruptcy
court lacked constitutional authority to enter judgment on counterclaim); Patrick M.
Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected a Shift in the
Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689, 693 (2006) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court’s
separation-of-powers jurisprudence increased the judiciary’s power by allowing a drift of
power from Congress to agencies and then to courts “whose authority has increased
because of the ways it can review the actions of administrative agencies”). But see
Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (taking a very
flexible approach to determining the “extent to which a given congressional decision to
authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal impermis-
sibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch”).
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At first blush, it might not seem like a very big step forward to
merely have Congress answer the ownership question and then direct
the rest of the issues to the judiciary. However, some thirty-five years
have passed since the Commission’s 1977 report recommended that
judges’ papers be regulated,324 and some twenty years have passed
since Congress held a hearing about the issue in the wake of the
release of Justice Marshall’s papers.325 During all these years, the judi-
ciary has done nothing to establish a set of rules to govern judicial
papers—allowing judicial papers to be handled in an ad hoc manner
as a species of private property. Thus, the main benefit of legislation
along the lines proposed here is that it would force the judiciary’s
hand, prompting the judiciary to bring some much-needed uniformity
to the treatment of judicial papers.
2. What Should the Rules Provide?
Assuming that Congress delegates to the judiciary the power to
fill in the details of a public ownership model for judicial papers, the
judiciary would have many issues to work through. These issues would
fall roughly into three main categories: (1) definitional terms, such as
what papers should be retained; (2) access terms, such as rules gov-
erning the timing of the release of papers; and (3) terms speaking to
the disposition of papers, such as where papers must be deposited.
a. Definitional Terms
As a threshold matter, the judiciary would need to determine pre-
cisely how to define which judicial working papers should be retained
and opened to the public and which should not. In making this deter-
mination, the judiciary would need to take into account any privacy
laws that might apply to personal information about third parties con-
tained in the papers.326 The judiciary would also need to consider the
sheer volume of records produced by the courts,327 particularly in
324 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the 1977 Commission Report).
325 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing congressional hearings).
326 See FJC GUIDE, supra note 16, at 28 (“Federal or state privacy laws may apply to
some personal information about third parties.”). But see supra note 12 (noting that the
Privacy Act does not apply to the judiciary).
327 In the context of the PRA, the sheer volume of presidential papers has proved chal-
lenging for the National Archives, leading to a processing backlog in libraries governed by
the PRA. Congress responded to this issue in 2009 by appropriating funds for twenty-five
new archival positions for the four presidential libraries with records controlled by the
Presidential Records Act. See Joint Hearing Before the Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure
& the Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 28, 29 (2011) (statement of Hon.
David S. Ferriero, Archivist of the U.S., National Archives & Records Administration)
(discussing funding).
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today’s electronic age.328 Furthermore, the impracticality—both in
terms of resources and interest—of preserving every scrap of paper or
every electronic record that emanates from a judge’s chambers also
would need to be kept in mind when crafting rules defining covered
papers.329 After all, there are more than 800 Article III federal judge-
ships in the country.330 If every paper or electronic file created by fed-
eral judges were preserved and disclosed,331 not only would significant
financial resources need to be expended to archive the materials, but
the sheer volume of the papers also would likely obscure the informa-
tion,332 thereby undercutting transparency and accountability
objectives.
In thinking about how best to approach the volume of the papers
created by hundreds of federal judges, the judiciary should consider
setting different definitional terms for different types of federal
courts, including one uniform set for the federal district courts, one for
the courts of appeals, and one for the U.S. Supreme Court. Papers
created by specialized federal courts, such as bankruptcy courts and
328 See, e.g., Presentation of the Historical Society of the D.C. Circuit, supra note 67, at
29–31 (noting that Judge Richard Arnold’s secretary had a practice of printing out e-mails
between judges and retaining them); id. at 37–38 (“If somebody says something to you in
an e-mail is it appropriate to save it? . . . [I]f you say something to someone in an e-mail
casually is it appropriate for, or do you want the other person to save it . . . [and] do they
have some obligation to tell the other person . . . ?”); see also FJC GUIDE, supra note 16, at
21 (“The chambers ‘papers’ of federal judges are becoming increasingly full of ‘documents’
that are ‘born digital . . . .’”); Transcript: Documents and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel
Discussion Moderated by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS
OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 221 (statement of Gerhard A. Gesell, J.,
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) (“We are in, as you all know, a Xerox
Age. It is physically impossible for me in my chambers to keep all the papers that come in.
I am throwing papers out all the time.”); id. at 222 (“I think we have to put the brakes
upon preservation of all of this material just because of the sheer enormity of it.”).
329 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 40 (“The Commission recognizes that
there will be neither sufficient resources nor interest in preserving all of the court-related
papers of all Federal Judges.”).
330 See Federal Judgeships, supra note 77.
331 In the context of presidential papers, many questions have arisen about how best to
deal with and capture electronic records. According to a Congressional Research Service
report, “[t]he PRA appears to require collection and maintenance of—and accessibility
to—the records of former Presidents, including those created electronically.” WENDY
GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT: BACKGROUND
AND RECENT ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2012); see also id. at 9 (summing up challenges for
collection and retention of electronic presidential records). However, the National
Archives and Records Administration has struggled to ensure that “ubiquitous and per-
haps ephemeral electronic records,” such as presidential use of social networking sites like
Twitter or Facebook, “can be collected, maintained, and accessed, regardless of format.”
Id. at 5.
332 See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D. Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1, 40 (2013) (noting that obscure information has a minimal risk of being
discovered or understood by unintended recipients).
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tax courts, would also likely require a distinct approach.333 The type
and volume of papers created at these different courts—and their his-
torical and curatorial values—varies sufficiently that guidelines differ-
entiating between federal courts would make sense,334 especially from
a fiscal perspective.335 However, in differentiating between different
federal courts, the judiciary would need to take care not to be overly
dismissive of the historical value of lower federal courts’ papers.
Given the high visibility of the U.S. Supreme Court, most people
easily recognize the historical value of the Supreme Court Justices’
papers. There, however, seems to be a general misperception that
lower federal court judges’ papers are of little historical value.336
b. Access
The judiciary would also need to carefully consider the question
of when and how judicial papers should be made accessible to the
public. Here the key would be to appropriately balance society’s
interest in prompt disclosure against potential harm to litigants and to
the judiciary that could occur if judicial papers were released too
quickly.337
In its 1977 report, the Commission suggested releasing judges’
papers no more than fifteen years after the federal judge left office.
According to the Commission, this approach would be advantageous
because it would allow flexibility: “[T]he Judge is the person most
likely to be able to make informed decisions as to which portions of
the collection might be opened earlier and which are sensitive enough
to require closure for the entire fifteen years.”338
333 With respect to bankruptcy courts, some bankruptcy judges’ papers have been
deposited at the Biddle Law Library at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. It is
home to the National Bankruptcy Archives. See Biddle Law Library: The National
Bankruptcy Archives, U. PA. L. SCH., https://www.law.upenn.edu/library/archives/bank-
ruptcy/index.php (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
334 See generally FJC GUIDE, supra note 16, at 12–14 (noting different types of papers
created by different kinds of federal courts).
335 See infra Part IV.D (discussing the cost of preserving judges’ papers).
336 See, e.g., Presentation of the Historical Society of the D.C. Circuit, supra note 67, at
22–23 (questioning whether many lower court judges’ papers are worth keeping). But see
supra notes 208–13 and accompanying text (discussing how even the papers of lower fed-
eral court judges have proven to be immensely helpful to scholars and researchers).
337 See Transcript: Documents and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel Discussion
Moderated by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS OF
FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 219 (statement of Walter F. Murphy, Professor
of Political Science, Princeton University) (noting the need for a reasonable “time lag to
protect litigants before the court, or who are about to come before the court, or who have
time to petition for a rehearing, or who might be involved in several pieces of litigation at
any one time”).
338 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 41.
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This kind of flexible approach, however, seems ill advised. If only
an outer point of disclosure were set (for example, “judges must dis-
close their papers within fifteen years of leaving the bench but may
release their papers sooner in their discretion”), then nothing would
prevent a judge from disclosing his or her papers as soon as the judge
left office. This might harm litigants’ interests, call into question the
finality of judgments, and damage the judiciary’s collegiality, integrity,
and confidentiality. Consider, for example, the controversy that
erupted after the prompt release of Justice Marshall’s papers. The
controversy highlighted how the appropriate timing of the release of
his papers implicated interests that went far beyond Justice Marshall,
extending to the sitting members of the Supreme Court and to the
judiciary as an institution.
Thus, in considering what kind of timing rule would be most
advisable, the judiciary should keep in mind that releasing judicial
papers too early can be just as problematic as releasing them too late:
Early releases run the risk of threatening litigants’ and the judiciary’s
interests, whereas late releases threaten society’s interest in disclosure
and governmental accountability as well as historians’ access to valu-
able information. To balance these concerns, the most sensible
approach would be for the judiciary to settle on a specific number of
years and to specify that judges’ papers shall be open to the public on
that date—no sooner and no later.
Courts would also need to resolve whether a specified time lag
would be sufficient to alleviate concerns about judicial privilege, par-
ticularly with respect to the disclosure of confidential communications
between judges and their law clerks. In United States v. Nixon, the
Supreme Court hinted in dicta that judicial deliberations might well
be protected by some kind of judicial privilege akin to executive privi-
lege by stating: “The expectation of a President to the confidentiality
of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim of confidenti-
ality of judicial deliberations, . . . has all the values to which we accord
deference for the privacy of all citizens.”339
In the case of the PRA, Congress—presumably trying to avoid
trampling on executive privilege—expressly enabled the President to
restrict access to “confidential communications requesting or submit-
ting advice, between the President and his advisers, or between such
advisers” for a period of twelve years.340 In light of this language, an
argument could be made that the PRA balanced the various com-
peting interests at play and decided that the presumption in favor of
339 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (emphasis added).
340 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(5) (2006).
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executive privilege should last for twelve years but no more.341
However, at least one federal district court has refused to read the
statute as abrogating the president’s constitutionally-based privilege
after the twelve-year clock has run.342 Instead, pointing to language in
the PRA, which states that “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to
confirm, limit, or expand any constitutionally-based privilege,”343 the
district court held that executive privilege survives beyond the twelve-
year period specified in the statute.344
Hence, in crafting regulations to implement the move to public
ownership for judicial papers, the judiciary would need to carefully
consider whether any assertions of judicial privilege should be allowed
to persist beyond a specified window of time. For example, if the
Judicial Conference settles on fifteen years as the appropriate point at
which judicial records shall be opened, would judges nonetheless
retain the ability to withhold certain records even beyond that fifteen-
year window by relying upon notions of a constitutionally-based judi-
cial privilege? One concern with allowing this is that the exception
might well swallow the rule; judges might simply assert judicial privi-
lege across the board and thereby indefinitely close their records off
from public scrutiny and historical research.
More importantly, it seems unnecessary to allow claims of judicial
privilege to persist beyond a specified period of time.345 Restricting
access to judicial papers for a determined period of time should be
sufficient to protect judges’ interests in the confidentiality of their
communications and correspondence with law clerks and other judges.
The Supreme Court itself suggested as much in the presidential
records context when it stated in Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services that “[t]he expectation of the confidentiality of executive
communications . . . has always been limited and subject to erosion
341 See Am. Historical Ass’n v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 402 F. Supp. 2d 171,
183–84 (D.D.C. 2005) (considering the claim that executive privilege did not extend
beyond the twelve-year period); see also H.R. 1255, the Presidential Records Act of 1978: A
Review of Executive Branch Implementation & Compliance, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Info. Pol’y, Census & Nat’l Archives of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform,
110th Cong. 16 (2007) (statement of Allen Weinstein, Archivist of the U.S.) (“[A]fter
twelve years, there is no statutory basis to withhold records that might be subject to a
constitutionally based privilege.”).
342 Am. Historical Ass’n, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 183–84.
343 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
344 See Am. Historical Ass’n, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 183–84 (“The Court will not read a
twelve year restriction on the president’s constitutionally-based privilege where Congress
has expressly refused to do so.”).
345 But see Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 401, 410–11 (1998) (holding
that the attorney-client privilege extends even beyond the death of the client).
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over time after an administration leaves office.”346 Similarly, in setting
rules to govern access to judicial papers, it would make sense for the
judiciary to determine that claims of judicial privilege erode over time
and that judicial privilege only operates to protect confidential judicial
communications for a specified period of time. Figuring out exactly
what that specified period of time should be is the million-dollar ques-
tion—and one that can only be properly answered after surveying fed-
eral judges and taking their views into account.
One promising approach that the judiciary should consider—and
solicit judges’ reactions to—would be for judges’ files to be made
available ten years after a judge leaves office but no sooner than fif-
teen years after any given case was decided.347 Such an approach
would balance the public’s interest in prompt disclosure against liti-
gants’ and the judiciary’s interest in protecting the finality of judg-
ments by enabling older case files to become public within ten years of
a judge leaving the bench. At the same time, this would also ensure
that new case files would not become public until at least fifteen years
after the case was decided.
c. Disposition
Finally, the Judiciary would also need to establish guidelines to
govern disposition. Specifically, the judiciary would need to decide
whether to give Justices and judges discretion in choosing an appro-
priate depository.
In 1977, the Commission recommended that “Justices and Judges
should be allowed to choose the depository for their Public
Papers.”348 Recent donations of Supreme Court Justices’ papers sug-
gest that this recommendation continues to deserve serious considera-
tion today. Specifically, during the past two decades, Justices have
selected a variety of different repositories for their papers. For
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist donated his papers to the Hoover
Institution Archives at his alma mater, Stanford University,349 and
Justice David Souter donated his papers to a historical society in his
home state of New Hampshire.350 In contrast, Justice Thurgood
Marshall and Justice Harry Blackmun donated their papers to the
346 433 U.S. 425, 451 (1977) (emphasis added).
347 See Judicial Panel Discussion, in 35 NAT’L STUDY COMM’N ON RECORDS &
DOCUMENTS OF FED. OFFICIALS 119 (1977) (suggesting that files be staggered so that a
judge’s old case files are opened earlier than newer case files).
348 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 40.
349 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
350 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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Library of Congress.351 These recent examples provide continued sup-
port for the Commission’s conclusion in 1977 that “judges will
respond more favorably to the exercise of public ownership in judicial
working papers if they may choose a depository which reflects their
regional identification, university affiliation, or other interest.”352
However, there is reason to be cautious about giving judges com-
plete control over where their papers will reside. For one thing, some
repositories, such as the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., are
more easily accessed than others, such as the New Hampshire
Historical Society located in Concord, New Hampshire. In addition,
some public repositories such as the Library of Congress may have
greater resources and technological capabilities to enable widespread
access to judicial papers in the future via online platforms.
Furthermore, some private depositories might take steps, such as
imposing significant access fees, that would impose a barrier to rea-
sonable public access. Hence, giving judges complete discretion to
determine where to donate their papers does not seem ideal. A better
solution might be to dictate that judges must give their papers to a
robust public institution such as the Library of Congress.
IV
POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
This Article’s central argument—that Congress should pass legis-
lation embracing a public ownership model for judicial papers while
empowering the judiciary to fill in the details of the regulatory
scheme—is likely to meet some resistance. In particular, there are at
least four primary objections to the proposal: (1) the risk of creating
perverse “chilling” effects; (2) financial costs; (3) judicial indepen-
dence and separation of powers; and (4) congressional inertia relating
to both congressional and judicial papers.
A. Perverse Chilling Effects
Perhaps the most significant objection that could be made against
a move toward public ownership is that doing so might have the per-
verse effect of causing judges to commit less to writing in their
attempt to evade public disclosure. This concern about “chilling
effects” was raised during hearings held by the Commission in the
1970s. For example, Judge Lumbard, one of the members of the
Commission, noted: “Any feeling that [a judge] has to preserve any-
thing that may be committed to paper is simply going to drive the
351 See supra notes 89, 100 and accompanying text.
352 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 40.
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judges not to commit things to paper, but simply to handle matters by
word of mouth or telephone.”353 Similarly, during one of the
Commission’s hearings, Judge McGowan noted: “Some judges are
going to respond to it by not writing as many memoranda as they
might, not putting down as much on paper, and perhaps walking down
the hall to talk to another judge rather than writing a
memorandum.”354
While these sorts of concerns are legitimate, they do not seem
insurmountable. For one thing, time restrictions, which assure judges
that judicial records will not be released for a specified period of time,
should help to minimize judges’ concerns about committing matters to
writing or communicating their views to other judges, who may then
commit the oral conversations to writing.355 If judges know with cer-
tainty that judicial papers will not be disclosed for some specified term
of years, then they should not be overly concerned about committing
matters to writing. In fact, such a regime—whereby judges know that
interjudge communications will remain closed for a specified period of
time before being disclosed—may actually raise less of a chilling effect
than the current system of private ownership, which allows individual
judges to release such records immediately upon retirement if they
wish.
Furthermore, in thinking about whether mandating the eventual
disclosure of judicial papers would unduly chill judicial deliberations,
it is reassuring to note that the current system of private ownership,
which allows one judge to decide whether to release interchambers
and interjudge communications, has not stopped judges from commu-
nicating with each other in a frank and candid manner. Since the 1956
publication of the first judicial biography that “rel[ied] on informal,
individual [Justices’] papers,”356 the Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, continue to deliberate in conference and to share
their views on cases with each other, and they continue to circulate
and share interchambers memoranda and draft opinions. So too do
lower federal court judges, despite prominent publications relying
353 Transcript: Documents and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel Discussion Moderated
by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS OF FEDERAL
OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 218 (statement of J. Edward Lumbard, Jr., J., U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
354 Id. at 240 (statement of Carl McGowan, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit).
355 See id. at 241 (“[A]ny legislation along this line . . . has to have[ ] some wisely con-
ceived time limitations and things like that in order to minimize the amount of simply
refraining from writing that would come about on the part of more cautious and timid
judges than on the part of others.”).
356 SAX, supra note 18, at 94.
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upon the papers of lower federal court judges.357 If our current
system, which allows the almost immediate release of interjudge com-
munications, has not unduly chilled judicial deliberations or
threatened candid interjudge communications, then it seems unlikely
that a public ownership model calling for disclosure of papers only
after a specified waiting period would do so.
Even with respect to a judge’s completely internal chamber dis-
cussions that the judge never shares with other judges (and hence that
the judge can currently choose never to disclose), it seems unlikely
that judges will be unduly chilled if eventual disclosure is mandated
moving forward. Indeed, a variety of factors are likely to push judges
to continue to commit matters to writing in their own chambers even
if they know that such intrachambers records will eventually be dis-
closed.358 For example, due to the nature of the drafting process and
the necessity of passing drafts back and forth between the judge and
his law clerks, judges are likely to continue to write various iterations
of draft opinions in their chambers even if they know that those draft
opinions will be made public. In addition, some judges may well
choose to create their own chambers records precisely because they
will become public someday and hence might enable historians to
look through that judge’s eyes rather than through the eyes of one of
his colleagues. One historian, for example, noted during a presenta-
tion on judicial records at the Historical Society of the D.C. Circuit
that when Chief Justice Warren Burger would tell her that he was
going to burn his papers, she would say to the Chief Justice: “[O]h, no,
that’s really a bad idea because if you burn your papers the history of
the Supreme Court will be told from the point of view of William
Brennan.”359
Finally, our country’s experience with the PRA lends further sup-
port to the notion that concerns about “chilling effects” stemming
from disclosure laws may be overblown. In the wake of the passage of
the PRA, concerns have arisen from time to time over whether the
PRA has prompted presidents to refrain from creating certain kinds
of written or electronic records.360 However, these concerns seem to
357 See, e.g., PRICE, supra note 207.
358 See SAX, supra note 18, at 97.
359 Presentation of the Historical Society of the D.C. Circuit, supra note 67, at 39–40.
360 See, e.g., PETER SEZZI, PERSONAL VERSUS PRIVATE: PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS IN A
LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC EXPLORATION 5 (2005) (noting PRA critics’
concern that legislated access would lead to a “‘Chilling Effect’—fearful of reappraisals by
opposing parties or a public unaware of the situation/context in which a document or
record was created who would use the information . . . to intimidate, expose or shame the
records’ creator, i.e., that fewer and fewer records will be created”); Ben Smith, Obama
Staff Will Say Cu L8r 2 IM, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2009, 8:09 PM), http://www.politico.com/
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be contradicted by evidence showing that “since the enactment of the
PRA, [the] growth of federal records has not abated.”361 Indeed,
“[d]espite the cry of critics of the PRA that the law would ensure only
that high-ranking executive branch officials would not keep records,
memoirs and recollections of presidential associates have grown in
number over time”—so much so that a Library of Congress heading
now specifically covers memoirs by former high-ranking executive
branch officials.362 These memoirs—although potentially one-sided
accounts—illustrate that the PRA has not prevented high-level execu-
tive officials from preserving and sharing their recollections.
Rather than creating serious “chilling effects,” the PRA instead
has been plagued mainly by concerns about presidential compliance
with the PRA’s disclosure requirements.363 Specifically, when it came
time for 68,000 pages of records from the Reagan administration con-
taining confidential advice and discussions to be released to the public
in 2001 at the end of the PRA’s twelve-year waiting period governing
confidential communications, President George W. Bush balked at
releasing the Reagan papers.364 Indeed, President Bush went so far as
to issue an Executive Order that, among other things, effectively
extended the PRA’s twelve-year delay for confidential communica-
tions indefinitely.365 This all goes to show that after the implementa-
tion of the PRA, presidents have continued to create tens of
thousands of pages of written and electronic records capturing confi-
dential communications, advice, and deliberations.366 But presidential
compliance and buy-in have proven shaky, highlighting the need to
focus on ways of maximizing the likelihood of judicial compliance
with any new disclosure requirement.367
news/stories/0109/17567.html (reporting that Obama Administration members were
instructed by lawyers that instant messaging programs would not be allowed in the White
House because of “fear of embarrassment if IMs were to be disclosed” after the president
leaves office).
361 SEZZI, supra note 360, at 5–6.
362 Id. 
363 See supra notes 310–15 and accompanying text.
364 See Deb Riechmann, Reagan’s Presidential Papers Finally Released, BOWLING
GREEN DAILY NEWS, Jan. 4, 2002, at 3-B.
365 See Exec. Order No. 13,233, 3 C.F.R. 815 (2002); see also Turley, supra note 17, at
671–72 (“Congress expressly stated that the twelve-year delay was a ‘buffer period’ for
confidential communications, balancing the legitimate concerns of the executive branch
with the public’s need to receive this information. The executive order would extend this
period indefinitely and . . . [thus] violates the very foundation of the PRA.”) (internal
citations omitted); supra notes 310–15 and accompanying text.
366 See Riechmann, supra note 364, at 3-B (referring to the 68,000 pages of confidential
records contained in Reagan’s files).
367 It is precisely because of the risk of noncompliance and the need to maximize judicial
buy-in that this Article proposes that the judiciary be given a significant role in filling in the
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In short, concerns about chilling judicial deliberations are real
and must be taken seriously when considering how to craft a rule
mandating disclosure of judicial papers. However, judges are likely to
continue to create both inter- and intrachambers judicial records even
if they know that such records will eventually see the public light—
just as presidents have continued to create records of confidential
deliberations and discussions in the wake of the PRA. This is espe-
cially likely to be true if judges are assured that their records will be
protected from premature disclosure by a sufficiently lengthy waiting
period.368
B. Financial Costs
Yet another major objection that could get in the way of a move
to a public ownership model is cost. Preserving, processing, and
retaining records in a publicly accessible facility can be a terribly
costly endeavor. For example, the cost of operating the Presidential
library system in fiscal year 2008 was more than $63 million, which
included funding for operating expenses, salaries and benefits,
security, operations and maintenance, and repairs or other infrastruc-
ture needs at the Presidential libraries.369
Exactly how much federal investment would be required would
likely depend on the specifics of the regulations developed by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, such as whether private
depositories would be involved in the receipt, cataloging, and
processing of judicial collections. One reason to allow the involvement
of private depositories is that some private depositories might well be
willing to bear all or much of the cost of managing high-profile or
noteworthy judges’ papers, such as Supreme Court Justices’ papers.
Regardless, it is clear that a shift to a public ownership model
would require the investment of significant federal resources. Thus,
the real question is not whether a public ownership model would
require financial investments but rather whether that investment is
warranted. In other words, should our federal government invest in
the preservation of federal judges’ papers? The answer to that
details of any scheme regulating judicial papers. See supra notes 315–16 and accompanying
text. By allowing the judiciary to decide the details of a new public ownership model
(rather than having Congress legislate with great specificity as it did in the PRA), Congress
should increase the likelihood of judicial compliance and buy-in.
368 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 41 (“If Judges can feel confident that
materials they consider sensitive will be protected from premature disclosure, they are far
more likely to produce a full and candid record of their judicial activities.”).
369 See NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR
PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES ISSUED IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF PL 110-404, at
14 (2009).
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question seems to be quite clearly “yes” when historical and cultural
interests are taken into account. As previously discussed, judicial
papers—both the papers of Supreme Court Justices and lower federal
court judges—have significant historical and cultural value. Under our
current model of private ownership, the cost of preservation has been
put in the hands of judges’ families and heirs, and as a result, judicial
papers have often been lost, scattered, or destroyed.370 If we are to
protect “an adequate historical record of the judicial decisionmaking
process, of the individuals who have served on the courts, or of the
relationship of the courthouse to the larger society,”371 then investing
in the preservation of judges’ papers is an endeavor that we as a
nation must be willing to make. It is also one that many judges should
embrace given that it will shift the financial burden of preserving our
nation’s history—particularly the financial burden of preserving lower
federal court judges’ papers—from judges and their families to the
government.372
C. Judicial Independence and Separation of Powers
A third possible objection is that Congress—in light of the sepa-
ration-of-powers concerns already discussed373—should respect the
judiciary’s independence and wait for the judiciary to address judges’
papers on its own initiative. On its face, this argument seems
appealing: The judiciary is the branch that would be most directly
impacted by any regulation of judges’ papers, so why not let it decide
by its own lights how best to deal with preservation and access to
judges’ papers? In addition, why risk a potential confrontation
between Congress and the judiciary if any confrontation could be
avoided by letting the judiciary rather than Congress regulate in the
area?
The main problem with this argument is that the judiciary has had
plenty of opportunities to take action but has shown no willingness or
inclination to do so. Indeed, in the wake of the release of Justice
Marshall’s papers, Congress quite clearly invited the judiciary to step
370 See supra Part I.B.
371 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 39.
372 Cf. Transcript: Documents and Records of the Judiciary, a Panel Discussion
Moderated by Geoffrey Hazard, Professor of Law, Yale University, in RECORDS OF
FEDERAL OFFICIALS, supra note 14, at 211, 232 (statement of Carl McGowan, J., U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) (“I wouldn’t certainly object . . . to
legislation which required me to turn [my papers] over to some agency for whatever they
want to do with them. . . . [I]t might be a great convenience, rather than to put them under
my arm and go home with them, to have somebody come and take them away.”).
373 See supra notes 316–23 and accompanying text.
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in and address the issue of judicial papers,374 but the judiciary did not
respond.375 If the judiciary is left to address the problem on its own
without any prompting from Congress, it seems likely that no uniform
rules will develop—leaving the fate of judicial papers in the hands of
individual judges.
Moreover, even if the judiciary did try to set uniform rules gov-
erning judicial papers without any prodding from Congress, the rules
would lack the force and effect of law given that the judiciary lacks the
legislative power to turn judges’ papers from public into private prop-
erty. At most, the judiciary could set some nonbinding guidelines or
norms for judges to look to regarding their papers. In addition,
without congressional funding to support the preservation of judges’
papers and without any basis for giving the guidelines legal effect,
there is no guarantee that the guidelines would be widely followed or
that they would have much success. If, for example, the guidelines
provided that no judge shall release his papers until fifteen years after
the judge retires from the bench, there would be nothing as a matter
of law that would prevent the judge from choosing to release his
papers earlier than fifteen years (potentially threatening the judi-
ciary’s confidentiality, collegiality, and integrity), or later than fifteen
years (potentially threatening society’s interest in disclosure and
accountability and historians’ interest in timely access to historically
valuable information).
D. Congressional Inertia Relating to Congressional as well as
Judicial Papers
Finally, another major objection that could be made against a
move toward a public ownership model relates to congressional
inertia—namely, that Congress is not likely to take action to overturn
the longstanding tradition favoring private ownership because doing
so might force Congress to address the fate of the papers of its own
congressional members.
This objection certainly has some force. The National Study
Commission recommended in 1977 that the papers of members of
Congress—consisting of “documentary materials in a Member’s office
files made or received by the Member and his staff in connection with
374 See, e.g., Judicial Papers Hearing, supra note 22, at 2–3 (statement of Sen. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Member, Subcomm. on Regulation and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs) (indicating that judicial attention to the issue would be welcome).
375 The only real movement that the judiciary has made toward dealing with the issue of
judicial papers is the Federal Judicial Center’s creation in 1996 and then revision in 2009 of
a guide, which merely provides curatorial suggestions to federal judges about how to pre-
serve their papers should they be inclined to do so. See FJC GUIDE, supra note 16, at v.
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official duties”—be treated as “the property of the United States.”376
Congress, however, has not taken steps to regulate the papers of its
own individual members377—just as it has failed to regulate judicial
papers. If Congress tried to regulate judges’ papers without regulating
its own members’ papers, Congress might look self-serving.378 This
concern, however, does not seem terribly strong when one considers
that Congress does much of its work in the public eye. Congress has
required that a great deal of its papers and deliberative processes be
preserved and publicly disclosed—leading to long trails of legislative
history. At the close of each Congress, pursuant to statutory com-
mand, “all the noncurrent records of the Congress and of each con-
gressional committee” must be transferred to the National Archives
and Records Administration for preservation.379 Daily proceedings
and floor debates are also preserved in the Congressional Record.380
Furthermore, even if it would not be palatable for Congress to
tackle judicial papers without also addressing the fate of papers of
individual members of Congress, that would not be such a bad thing.
Indeed, it would be a positive development since the question of who
should own congressional papers—like the question of who should
own judicial papers—has rarely been asked in our nation’s history and
deserves attention and scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Some thirty-five years after the National Study Commission rec-
ommended that judicial papers be treated as governmental rather
than private property, neither the judiciary nor Congress has chosen
to regulate judicial papers, leaving the ultimate disposition of judicial
papers—including Supreme Court papers relating to cases of signifi-
cant national concern like the Affordable Care Act case—up to the
376 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 35.
377 See Judicial Papers Hearing, supra note 22, at 4 (statement of Sen. Thad Cochran,
Member, Subcomm. on Regulation and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on Governmental
Affairs) (noting that Congress has not chosen to regulate the papers of its own members
but that it has regulated the papers of congressional committees).
378 Cf. PRA Hearing, supra note 164, at 75–76 (statement of Rep. Allen E. Ertel)
(responding to the concern “that it would be unfair to put restrictions on accessibility to
the Presidential papers and not to congressional and judicial papers” by expressing intent
to “take the Commission report and try to redraft it into legislative form so we can . . . have
access to congressional and judicial papers,” and explaining that “[t]he reason we did not
include it in our proposal was the fact that we are advised it would be better done as a
resolution of the House and thereby change the rules, rather than by statutory
enactment”).
379 44 U.S.C. § 2118 (2006) (emphasis added).
380 About the Congressional Record, LIBR. CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/home/abt.cong.
rec.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
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whims of individual Justices and judges. The consequence has been
tremendous inconsistency surrounding access to and disposition of
judges’ working papers: Some papers have been destroyed, shredded,
burned, or lost; others have been closed to the public for long periods
of time; and others yet have been publicly released almost immedi-
ately after the judge who created them left the bench. This ad hoc,
laissez-faire system has not effectively served the many competing
interests that surround judicial papers.
The PRA, which shifted presidential records from a private to a
public model of ownership, suggests a possible path forward for judi-
cial papers—namely, that Congress could enact legislation declaring
judicial working papers, like presidential papers, to be governmental
property. Given significant differences between the roles and constitu-
tional design of the President and judges, including the independence
of our judiciary, it would not be wise to import the PRA wholesale
into the judicial context. Nonetheless, a promising approach would be
for Congress to pass legislation declaring that judicial papers moving
forward will be viewed as governmental property and to empower the
judiciary to promulgate rules governing the specifics of access to and
disposition of the papers. By involving the judiciary in the implemen-
tation process rather than trying to dictate the terms itself, Congress
would likely enhance the likelihood of judicial compliance and buy-in;
enable the judiciary to craft rules aimed at safeguarding litigants’
rights as well as judicial independence, legitimacy, candor, collegiality,
and confidentiality; and help to mitigate separation-of-powers
concerns.
In the end, if Congress does not take action to force the judi-
ciary’s hand, then it seems unlikely that the judiciary will formulate
any uniform guidelines of its own. The judiciary, after all, has had
plenty of opportunities to do so in the past but simply has not shown
any inclination to regulate in this area. Without congressional action,
the fate of judicial papers—and the many broad historical, institu-
tional, societal, and individual interests that judicial papers impli-
cate—will likely continue to be governed by individual Justices and
judges rather than by rules. That would be an unfortunate outcome
for history, society at large, and the judiciary as an institution.
